Military Theory XII. [Conclusion]

This is coolbert:

With regard to the development of a military theory, it does seem that in a period of two hundred years now, NO concise theory has been developed that satisfies the "experts".

At the least, the "finding" of such a theory may be described as being VERY DIFFICULT at best.

Military theory may be very well a subject that does NOT have absolute laws as does physics. Rather a constantly changing and evolving set of laws that are very hard to understand at any given moment.

Again, military theory, as it exists now, is generally divided into three "categories". Which are:

* Philosophy of war. Why wars are fought, the reasons for, the rationalities, etc.

* Preparations for war.

* Actual fighting of the war itself. Strategy, operational art, tactics.

Consider these comments regarding tactics and such:

See this comment [from a previous blog entry] on tactics [tactics alone here] from a "brother officer" as being told to Suvorov:

"Tactics, brother, are the most complicated subject on earth. But just tell our generals that tactics are more complicated than chess and they laugh their heads off, they simply don't believe it. But it's really no laughing matter. Chess is the crudest form, the most superficial model of a battle between two armies and the most primitive of armies [based upon the armies of the Mahabharata, 1400 B.C.] at that. In all other respects, it's exactly like war . . . A contemporary battle . . . is a thousand times more complicated than chess. If you want to model a small contemporary army on a chess board, the number of chess men, with all kinds of different capabilities will have to be sharply increased. Somehow, you will need to designate tanks, anti-tank rockets, anti-tank artillery and attack planes, strategic bombers, air transport and helicopters - - you just can't list them all . . . and all demand a united plan, a united strategy and the closest possible co-ordination."

Please also see this comment from esteemed reader of this blog, SciFiGeek:

"I think there are no laws of warfare because there are just so many variables that the ability to size things up in the moment and react accordingly far outweighs any theory a clever theorist can come up with. Kind of like why business school is so short on theory and so long on case studies.

With law, it's different because you're dealing with outcomes in an artificially created system. With physics, the systems are much simpler (one ball flying through space) so you can predict a lot more a priori. But war is thousands of people trying to kill thousands of other people. It's really hard to predict."

"Thousands of people trying to kill thousands of other people". And using a variety of weapons, machines, tactics, doctrine, etc., to do so. Operating in an environment which is called the "fog of war" [uncertainty as to what is what on the part of the decision makers].

Yes, and even the most casual of observers can get the gist instantly, we are talking about a complexity that humans find almost totally incapable of dealing with. Trying to explain such behavior with simple aphorisms [simple statements of truth], according to Du Puy, is next to impossible. If NOT impossible.

Also, military theory, as it exists, would be constantly open to change. Much as is almost any other theory of any other scientific discipline.

For example, the tactics as espoused by Clausewitz and Jomini were NO LONGER effective only fifty years later. I have blogged about this before many times.

And the methods of organizing a nation-state for war as enunciated by Shaposhnikov are not valid to the same extent any more as the type of total war, in an almost absolute context, as fought in World War One or Two will in all probability not be fought any more [too expensive].

Philosophies of war, why war is fought, rationalities, etc., this is perhaps the one category where the most understandable and constant and "eternal" laws can be found.

And, as I have said, with all theories, constant change will be seen.

For three hundred years, Newton's theory of gravity held true, and does hold true in a largely general sense today.

Newton's theory of gravity breaks down when particle of light pass within close distance of a massive gravitational object. This was not conceived or could have been understood during the time of Newton.

Does this mean Newton was wrong?? NO! Only that changing observations and understandings modified his basic theory in a way Newton could not have anticipated or even understood.

Perhaps it is best that military theory is looked at in the same manner.

coolbert.

Military Theory XI.

This is coolbert:

Finally, John Boyd.

John Boyd. Hot shot American Air Force fighter jock. Military theorist and strategist of recent time [Boyd passed away in 1997].

Arrived on the scene to see limited combat in Korea. Had more important duties during the Vietnam War than command and engage in aerial combat. Did NOT have extensive combat experience. But AN EXPERIENCED military man and superb fighter jet pilot whose nickname was "Forty-Second-Boyd".

"as a result of a standing bet that he could maneuver from a position of disadvantage (challenger on his tail) to advantage (positions reversed) in 40 seconds — or pay the challenger 40 dollars. "

A man who gave much thought to warfare.

An engineer [Master Degree in Engineering from Georgia Tech] who applied scientific and engineering concepts to the theory of aerial combat and warfare in general.

Boyd's theories and strategies can be applied at the micro [one-on-one aerial combat between two jet fighter aircraft] and macro [the First Gulf War was fought by American forces using Boyd's concepts!!??] level both.

Boyd's most famous concept and contribution to military strategy is what he called OODA.

Observe, Orient, Decide, Act.

This can be seen in a power point slide presentation found here.

[get a free power point viewer from MS to see the slide presentation.]

Boyd WAS instrumental in the design and development of both the F-15 and F-16 fighter planes. Aircraft that have become world famous and have had an amazing life expectancy and a proven combat record.

Boyd DID NOT present his theories in the form of a book as did theorists such a Clausewitz or Jomini. Was NOT a prolific writer in the style of say Fuller.

Presented his strategies, theories and concepts in the form of oral briefings, power point slide presentations, etc. As a man of the late 20th century would do so. As you would expect from a man of the caliber and intensity of Boyd.

I am not sure of how wide spread is the acceptance of Boyd and his theories? Boyd DOES have a considerable number of followers and adherents to his concepts in the U.S. military, in all branches. Beyond that, I cannot say.

[I have a sneaking suspicion that Boyd was involved in the Igloo White project during the Vietnam War. A state-of-the-art engineering project that WOULD have required a commander and officer with the engineering background of Boyd. I can confirm this, but I have good intuition about this!]

coolbert.

Military Theory X.

This is coolbert:

Again, Du Puy IS of the opinion that NO ONE has significantly advanced military theory since the time of Lanchester.

In MY opinion, this may not be exactly true.

Let me add two names for consideration.

Boris Shaposhnikov and John Boyd. The former a Marshal of the Soviet Union, the latter an American fighter pilot jock of recent times.

Boris Shaposhnikov.

Czarist military officer and communist military leader. Marshal of Soviet Union. Chief of Staff of the Red Army during World War Two [WW2]. A man who was a personal favorite of Stalin. It is reputed that Shaposhnikov was the ONLY man Stalin addressed in the familiar manner [Boris Michaelovitch]. A man respected by Stalin. A Marshal of the Soviet Union who SURVIVED the Stalinist purges of the late 1930's.

The author of Mozg Armii [Brain of the Army]. Describes how a modern army of the Twentieth Century organizes and prepares for combat in the nature of war as fought in both World War One [WW1] and Two [WW2].

Shaposhnikov uses the Austro-Hungarian Empire and it's army as the archetype of a "modern" nation and it's pre-war preparations.

Here is a BabelFish translation from the table of contents for the on line version of Mozg Armii.

[I cannot find an English translation on the web.]

Babel Fish Translation

"Introduction

I. Austria-Hungary in the beginning KHKH [?] of century [20th].

II. Austro-Hungarian army and fleet in the beginning KHKH [?] of century [20th].

III. The General Staff of Austro-Hungarian army.

IV. Chief of the General Staff Conrad [Conrad was Chief of the General Staff.].

V. Shadows of the past.

VI. Dumas [?] about the chief of the General Staff.

VII. Austro-Hungarian General Staff in the persons [personalities thereof??].

VIII. Portrait gallery of General Staff.

IX. "from it all qualities" [?]

X. Conrad and the internal life of Austria-Hungary.

XI. "search" into the history chapter [?].

XII. Domestic policy and General Staff.

XIII. Conrad in questions of armament and supply of army.

XIV. The preparation of Austria-Hungary for the war.

XV. Historical information.

XVI. The economy and war.

epilogue

sources

note"

That translation is the best I can muster. Sorry if it is not so clear. But I think you get the gist and the flavor.

Shaposhnikov describes how a nation utilizes the human, natural, industrial, and technological resources at it's disposal to organize and prepare for total war. A subject that has been dealt with in a previous blog entry. War as was fought in both WW1 and WW2. Total mobilization of resources to support the war effort. How the General Staff of a nation guides and organizes the effort.

Supposedly this was favored reading material of Stalin. As I have said, Stalin had warm feelings for Shaposhnikov. I am not sure if that is good or bad.

The topic of Mozg Armii was germane for it's time. NOT any more. Nations cannot afford the cost of waging war as it was fought in WW1 and WW2. The necessary weaponry is too costly, sophisticated, and needs trained, experienced manpower [a professional army], to be able to utilize to the fullest.

The ideas of Shaposhnikov are not valid to a large extent for modern militaries. Were valid in their own time, but not now.

coolbert.

Military Theory IX.

This is coolbert:

In the opinion of Du Puy, there has been no one that has sufficiently advanced military theory since the time of Lanchester.

And, no one has ever been able to consolidate the works of Clausewitz [especially Clausewitz!!] and others and come up with a concise military theory.

"it is an unfinished work ["On War"], and we suspect that had he [Clausewitz] been able to complete it in the fashion that he planned, he might have been able to integrate its many brilliant thoughts and concepts into a single, comprehensive theory. But he did not, and all of us [Du Puy includes himself] who have attempted to distill that coherent theory from the book have been frustrated."

It may just be that the task is too difficult for anyone.

Lanchester's equations for example. Even Lanchester was of the opinion that his equations modeled warfare without taking into account a myriad of factors that mitigated correctness. Generally the equations are correct, but of course only in a general sense.

"mathematical prediction of casualties and the actual casualties would coincide only when all other things are equal, and then he [Lanchester] added 'superior morale or better tactics, or a hundred and one other extraneous issues may intervene in practice.'"

In the case of an artillery duel, you would have a lot of factors to consider that work against total equality totally applied.

For instance [not totally inclusive of all factors]:

* Range of the guns.

* Accuracy of the guns,

* Lethality of the rounds fired.

* Rate of fire.

* Training of the gun crews.

* Accuracy of targeting.

* Ability to communicate corrections.

And this just for an artillery duel.

On the MODERN battlefield, with combined arms being employed, infantry, artillery, armor, air defense and ground attack aircraft all working in concert create a situation that is even much more complex and difficult to model.

Also, the cook-book type of doctrines, tactics, strategies, etc., of both Clausewitz and Jomini break down on the battlefield when confronted by weapons with far greater lethality than that encountered by either man.

Clausewitz and Jomini both were veterans of the Napoleonic type of warfare. Closed bunches of troops advancing over open ground to within close range of the enemy, exchanging musket fire at short range, followed by an advance with the bayonet.

Fifty years later, such tactics were to prove mostly naught in the face of the rifled musket firing a conoidal bullet. Riflemen of the American Civil War [Cold Harbor - - 10,000 casualties in ten minutes!!], the Franco-Prussian War [Mars-La-Tour - - 5,000 dead in fifteen minutes!!], and the Russo-Turkish War ["I send out companies and only squads return!!"] could fire more rapidly, at much longer ranges, and with greater accuracy. Tactics of the Napoleonic era was ineffective against such weapons handled by determined riflemen.

With the changing nature of weaponry on the battlefield, even the greats are wrong.

That is somewhat unfair, of course, as Clausewitz and Jomini, COULD NOT have anticipated such a quantum leap in lethality. Their cook-book methods of warfare were appropriate for their time in history.

coolbert.

Military Theory VIII.

This is coolbert:

Frederick Lanchester.

Englishman who during World War One [WW1] [1916] devised mathematical equations to explain the nature of warfare.

Approached the problem as would an engineer, which he was [Lanchester was an engineer who had amazing success in his profession. Was instrumental in both the automotive and aeronautic industries in formulating many solutions to problems].

"Englishman Frederick W. Lanchester (1868-1946) was a major contributor to the foundation of automotive and aeronautical engineering. He also published works on radio, acoustics, warfare, and even relativity. His equations of combat form the basis of the science of operations research. (These equations have been used to formulate business strategy in recent times.) He was the first to describe the aeronautics of lift and drag. His automobile inventions include the gas engine starter, rack-and-pinion steering, disk brakes, four-wheel drive, and fuel injection."

Sought to model warfare creating differential equations that explain what is seen on the battlefield. Much as an engineer would model any other process or phenomenon.

Was successful.

Created a pair of differential equations THAT ARE USED TO THIS DAY IN COMPUTER SIMULATIONS OF WARFARE. Equations that have a degree of validity in modeling warfare on the battlefield

"Lanchester's equations. Basically, Lanchester observed that as ranged fires [indirect fires] replaced close combat as the primary casualty generator, the nature of warfare changed, and gave a great deal more emphasis on numeric superiority.

For example, in a battle between 1000 men on side A and 750 men on side B in the era of close combat (sword and shield), you'd wind up with 250 men on Side A and 0 on Side B after an engagement to the finish. That's a 75% loss rate for the superior force.

With ranged fire [indirect fire], you have a more complex situation."

"In his historic 1916 paper "Mathematics in Warfare," Lanchester presents two simple differential equations relating force attrition to the number of forces or weapons in opposition and to their effectiveness (see sidebar "Lanchester's Equations"). The equations' solutions show that the effectiveness of a force is directly proportional to the effectiveness of its weapons and to the square of its numbers. The following table illustrates how Lanchester's equations would apply in a classic artillery duel:

The Lanchester Exchange: Artillery Duel



The table shows 200 weapons arrayed against 100 weapons with equal kill probabilities (Pk) of 10 percent. In the first round, Orange kills 20 Blues, and Blue kills 10 Oranges leaving 190 Oranges to kill 19 of the remaining 80 Blues, while the Blues kill 8 Oranges in the second round. At the end of the sixth round, all the Blues are gone and 168 Oranges (84 percent) remain.

Note that each side engages only the remaining live targets. If neither side can tell when it has killed a target, as in some artillery duels, both sides must continue to shoot at all the targets, thereby wasting part of their efforts. Lanchester analyzed this problem also and showed that the impact of numbers is a linear not square law."

[I would not be so rash to go into a more complicated explanation of these parallel differential modeling equations, other than to say that they exist and they have a degree of validity that has been vindicated.]

However, according to Du Puy, there is a problem with Lanchester's equations and how they apply to war in the REAL WORLD:

"Efforts to relate either or both of the Lanchester laws to historical attrition results have almost always failed"

"there will probably never be a close and easily recognizable relationship between real world attrition rates and those produced by his use of equations."

"his equations were valid only in situations in which the opposing forces are of equal quality, and are affected equally by the circumstances of the battle."

Such EQUAL QUALITY, AFFECTED EQUALLY is almost NOT found, if not at all found on the REAL battlefield.

Lanchester is "close", but not quite.

See more on Lanchester's equations by clicking here and here.

coolbert.

Military Thoughts VII.

This is coolbert:

Now to J.F.C. Fuller.

British military officer before and after World War One [WW1].

Had a distinguished record during that conflict. Was a controversial and acerbic writer in the years after the war as well. Was retired early in his career after reaching the rank of Major General. Did not participate in World War Two [WW2] as it was decided he had definite fascist tendencies. His lack of participation was probably to the detriment of the British.

From De Gaulle:

"But what about your best soldier, General Fuller? He was our prophet, we only followed him . . . You will find prophesized in his books everything the Germans did with tanks. I have often wondered why he is not used."

Considered to be the greatest military historian and analyst of military affairs in the Twentieth Century [according to Du Puy].

The one man who made the greatest strides in military theory since the time of Clausewitz and Jomini.

The main contribution made by Fuller was to enumerate and enunciate the principles of war.

Prior to Fuller, officers and persons aspiring to command were told to study the principles of war. But no one could agree as to what those principles were, much less to make a list of them.

Only during a period of preparation for a general European war which he felt was at hand did Fuller discover that NO list of the basic principles of war existed.

"British officers should understand 'the fundamental principles of war [which] are neither very numerous nor in themselves very abtruse.'"

As I have said, no such list of the fundamental principles existed. NO list was enumerated or agreed upon. It was up to each officer to decide for himself what was relevant and what was not.

Fuller, after intensive study of the campaigns of Napoleon, did arrive at a list of principles he felt were instrumental to the success of the Emperor.

[Fuller probably followed a regimen of study that was similar to what Napoleon did over one hundred years earlier. Study the military campaigns of the "great Captains". Find out what contributed to their success. And when there was failure, find out why there was failure. An understanding of reasons for and against success will inevitably lead to the principles as enunciated by Fuller.]

These were:

* Objective.

* Mass.

* Offensive.

* Surprise.

* Security.

* Movement.

* Economy of Force.

* Cooperation.

The British Army, in the years after WW1, adopted these principles "in toto" as their standard.

The American Army did also, with two modifications. Substituting the word MANEUVER for movement and adding SIMPLICITY and UNITY OF COMMAND for cooperation. Both these changes seem to be valid and are merited. The word maneuver being to use movement [mobility] to gain an advantage. Cooperation=Simplicity + Unity of Command also worthy.

It must also be noted that Fuller, WAS NOT able to codify a military theory as he would have liked.

"Fuller knew that there should be more content and more scientific rigor to a theory of combat [military theory] than just the Principles of War, but he never quite succeeded in formulating such a theory."

Also, keep in mind the admonitions of the friendly but bemused British Sergeant Major when observing Cadet Bill Slim [later to become a senior British commander in WW2] attempting to do exactly what Fuller was doing at the same time during WW1, namely, discover what the principles of war were. According to the British Sergeant Major, the basics of war boiled down to:

"Hit the other guy as hard as you can, as fast as you can, where it hurts him the most, and when he ain't lookin'".

Well, can someone suggest something better??!!

coolbert.

Military Theory VI.

This is coolbert:

From the time of Clausewitz and Jomini, there is an almost one hundred year period where little or NO additional insight was gained into military theory.

That is not to say that there were a whole host of military men that commented on military history, wrote extensively on the subject, and alluded to military theory. But these authors seem to NOT have added to the subject in a significant manner.

This list of military writers would include such luminaries as:

Dennis Mahan. American military author. Father of the later to be great military author Alfred Mahan.



"He was the first great American military theorist. He compiled his own version of maxims and rules he thought relevant to military theory in America, but he never tried to produce a theory."

von Moltke the Elder. The great Prussian commander. Presided over the Prussian Army during the time of German reunification and the elevation of Germany with Prussia at the lead as one of the world's great powers.



"an eminent historian and eminent military thinker. . . . he did little to advance military theory . . ."

Ardant du Picq. French military officer at the time of the Franco-Prussian War [1870].

"perhaps the most perceptive writer on the subject of moral forces [behavioral considerations] in war."

Alfred Mahan. Great American military writer and theorist. Son of Dennis Mahan. Concentrated on naval warfare. Demonstrated through his writings the importance that navies have played throughout history.



"He recognized and analytically employed principles, but never attempted a scientific, analytical approach to military theory."

[military leaders and statesmen of world caliber around the year 1900 would have found the writings of Mahan to be obligatory reading. As I have said in a previous blog entry, all self-respecting world powers of the period found it necessary to have vast pelagic [deep-water] navies to show the flag the world over. Germany, Great Britain, France, United States, Japan, Russia, and even the Austro-Hungarian Empire all desired and had large navies that could extend power and "reach" to all parts of the world.]

von Schlieffen. Chief of Staff of the German Army in the period 1891-1905. Formulated the famous Schlieffen Plan.



"another thoughtful, profound thinker on war, who never attempted to distill a theory of combat from his obviously encyclopedic knowledge of military history . . . "

von der Goltz. German military thinker.

"refers frequently - - if somewhat vaguely - - to the theory of war, and to its principles."

Foch. Frenchman who commanded the allied forces on the Western Front at the end of World War One [WW1]. Is reputed to have taught metaphysics [philosophy] in his "spare" time.



"He did try to think and write in scientific, theoretical terms, and there was much that was sound in his approach to analyzing military history."

Douhet. Italian WW1 military officer turned military aviator.



"was the first and most important theorist of air warfare . . . put together a coherent, consistent theory of air warfare, which correctly anticipated the dominant role of airpower in all subsequent wars [after WW1]."

Again, these men all contributed to military theory, but not advancing the subject in a big way. NOT in the manner of a Clausewitz or a Jomini.

coolbert.

Military Theory V.

This is coolbert:

Jomini was a Swiss national who served in the army of Napoleon, rising to high rank.

Was a contemporary and rival of Clausewitz.

Wrote "The Art of War" based upon his observations of the methods of Napoleon.

Described by Du Puy as:

"undeniably a man of great analytical ability, highly intelligent, even brilliant".

But:

"saw the trees, but not the forest."

DID NOT, and has not been seen, as achieving the intellectual brilliance of Clausewitz. WAS NOT a philosopher as was his rival.

"The Art of War" is written as a how-to, cook-book guide for military commanders. Replete with diagrams, algebraic equations, geometrics, etc. At the time of the American Civil War, this would have been THE book carried around by senior commanders. It is reputed the Chief Of Staff of the Union Army, General Halleck, carried the "The Art of War" with him at all times.

Consider, however, this comment of Grant on such cook-book methods to warfare:

"If men make war in slavish obedience to rules, they will fail."

Also consider this from a web site that describes the U.S. Army of the modern era to be a "Jominian institution"??!!

Again, the writings of Jomini are a hard read. Written in an obtuse style that is difficult for moderns to understand. Here also an annotated version is desirable??!!

coolbert.

Military Theory IV.

This is coolbert:

Clausewitz is considered to be the GREATEST contributor to military theory as understood by the western world.

Approached war and military theory from both the cook-book, nuts and bolts aspect AND the PHILOSOPHICAL standpoint.

Clausewitz is the STANDARD against all others are judged with regard to military theory.

It is important to note that the great work of Clausewitz on military theory, "On War", was an UNFINISHED work. Clausewitz, writing the book while serving as commandant of the {Prussian military academy, passed on during a cholera epidemic before his opus magnus could be completed.

Clausewitz is undeniably a man of the most profound intellectual brilliance. This may seem to the modern world as a contradiction. That a military man can be a philosopher of the foremost ranking. Yet it seems to be true. Clausewitz, even when not serving in his pedagogical role as commandant of a military academy, indulged in all manner of intellectual pursuits beyond the military sphere. A fertile mind of intensity.

Once again, according to Fuller:

"In my opinion, Clausewitz's level is on that of Copernicus, Newton, and Darwin."

And, according to Du Puy:

"Clausewitz was an intellectual giant worth of comparison . . . with his contemporary philosophers Kant and Hegel."

However, as with most philosophical works, "On War" is a hard read. Of course, the English speaker is reading a translation from the original German. To the degree that works of philosophy can be translated without losing meaning is something that I cannot speculate about.

It would almost seem that the translation of "On War" needs to be ANNOTATED by the "experts", the "experts" being in agreement to the extent that they can be. I am not sure if this has been or can be done?

coolbert.

Military Theory III.

This is coolbert:

Napoleon offers little than his "Maxims" with regard to military theory.

[these are the merely the military maxims. Napoleon is quoted from as possessing a whole lot of maxims on a whole lot of subjects.]

De Puy states that Napoleon MUST have believed that a military theory did exist.

Other than the maxims, Napoleon DID NOT commit to writing any thing else on military theory.

Napoleon says that to become great, as he had become great, one needed to studied the battles and campaigns of the "masters". Persons from the initial era of black powder warfare that were successful. Mentors to Napoleon.

"Read over and over again the campaigns of Alexander, Hannibal, Caesar, Gustavus, Turenne, Eugene and Frederic. ... This is the only way to become a great general and master the secrets of the art of war."

Napoleon was of course only twenty six when he began his campaigns of conquest.

The amount of real world military experience Napoleon had at the time was meagre. He WAS NOT a seasoned veteran who had studied UNDER the masters tutelage and with time had become a master himself. He seemed to know what to do and do correctly from the start.

And again, at age twenty six.

It is hard for me to comprehend that at that age, Napoleon had absorbed and ruminated long and hard on the battles and campaigns of the masters to such an extent that he was so ready as he was. And yet, HE WAS!!

coolbert.

Military Theory II.

This is coolbert:

Du Puy lists twelve figures since the time of Napoleon whose writings have influenced modern [in the last two hundred years] military theory.

In chronological order:

* Clausewitz.

* Jomini.

* Mahan [Denis] the Elder.

* Moltke the Elder.

* du Picq.

* Mahan [Alfred] the Younger.

* Von Schlieffen.

* von der Goltz.

* Foch.

* Douhet.

* Fuller.

* Lanchester.

Modern American enthusiasts and those interested in military theory would add the name of Boyd.

I would add myself the name of Shaposhnikov.

coolbert.

Military Theory I.

This is coolbert:

For two centuries, military thinkers in the western world have been trying to formulate a military theory.

Seemingly without a lot of success.

It would be agreed that there MUST be a military theory.

It MUST be so and has been the topic of a lot of speculation by the most eminent military minds for at least two hundred years now.

And the results of all this speculation has been a hit and miss affair for the most part. A lot of progress has been made to develop military theory, but Du Puy is most adamant that a solution to the problem has NOT been found to the satisfaction of the "experts".

According to J.F.C. Fuller:

"it is an extraordinary thing that whilst every science is run on a few definite principles, war today [1916] should be run on the dice-box of luck . . . We can predict certain events in war as surely as Darwin could in life."

Theory is defined as:

1 : the analysis of a set of facts in their relation to one another
2 : abstract thought : SPECULATION
3 : the general or abstract principles of a body of fact, a science, or an art
4 a : a belief, policy, or procedure proposed or followed as the basis of action b : an ideal or hypothetical set of facts, principles, or circumstances -- often used in the phrase in theory
5 : a plausible or scientifically acceptable general principle or body of principles offered to explain phenomena
6 a : a hypothesis assumed for the sake of argument or investigation b : an unproved assumption : CONJECTURE c : a body of theorems presenting a concise systematic view of a subject "

Using this definition, #5 is most pertinent.

"5 : a plausible or scientifically acceptable general principle or body of principles offered to explain phenomena"

It must be kept in mind that military theory is not testable.

Is the same type of "science" as is astronomy.

"You cannot test the theories. ONLY real world experience allows to see if predictions can be made and confirmed as a means of testing the theory."

"We cannot move the planets around in the heavens to see if our theories of gravity and the calculations regarding orbits are correct. We can make predictions based upon the theory of gravity we have developed and determine if our calculations of future planetary motion is correct. "

"Military theory must be approached in the same way. Develop hypothesis and theory and see in the real world if predictions based upon the hypothesis and theory are correct."

According to Du Puy, military theory as it is understood now consists of three categories, each with overlap.

These categories are:

* Political and philosophical. Concerns at the highest levels of government leaderships as to why and when to fight wars. Deals with the rationality and reasons[??] for waging war in the first place and what exactly is this thing we call WAR.

* The preparations a society makes for waging war.

* The actual fighting of the war itself.

Such is how military theory is categorized at the present time.

Keep in mind that military theory, as is all other "theories" that have a scientific foundation, is constantly undergoing change as new ideas, perspectives, data, etc., are brought to light for contemplation.

coolbert.

Scale.

This is coolbert:

In my previous blog I have commented on the article, "The Origins of War". And stated that I was not at all satisfied with the author's explanations as to the origins of war. For a variety of reasons.

It just seems that being able to define what exactly is war is part of the problem.

Perhaps it is wise in this case to remind ourselves of De Puy's verity of combat # 13. "Combat is too complicated a subject to be described in an aphorism [simple statement of truth]".

[When De Puy is speaking of combat he is speaking about the tactics and aspects of the operational art that will achieve strategic goals on the battlefield and in war].

Perhaps De Puy's verity of combat # 13 can be also be reasonably restated as, "WAR is too complicated a subject to be described in an aphorism!"

Perhaps the textbook definition of war as being two groups of people using arms, each to trying to impose their will upon the other is just too broad? As would be the dictum of Clausewitz, "war is politics by other means."

Using this definition, blood feuds, skirmishes, cattle rustling could be categorized as war.

This is not war as modern people understand war. Moderns think of war as an army invading the territory of the foe, defeating the foe's army, occupying the foe's land, and breaking the will of the foe to resist further. This is war as moderns understand it. War as understood by moderns DOES seem to imply a large scale organization of society with a political structure that has a leadership that can command resources and dedicate themselves to goals that have finite and realistic aspect.

But, then, what is in to make of say what is occurring right now in the Congo? Factions of heavily armed men, usually but not exclusively so organized along tribal lines, have been waging what only be called war for a number of years now [ever since the Rwandan genocide of 1994]. It is reputed that MILLIONS of persons have been killed in this little reported "conflict". However, organization, strategy, plans, goals, leadership at a high political level just seems to be totally lacking here. And yet, can anyone deny that this is anything but WAR??

If, then, aphorisms and dictum do not suffice, what does??

Perhaps rather than just looking at war, we must look at the war AND peace as part of a continuum?

Perhaps the best vehicle for understanding this subtlety would be what I would call the war/peace polar opposite sliding scale continuum. [yeah, I know that is mouthful].

Such a continuum is analogous to the yin and yang of Chinese daoist philosophy. NOT a religion, more a philosophy of organizing phenomenon observed in nature to an understandable format. [white and black, hot and cold, tall and short, on and off, male and female, light and dark, etc.].

At one end of the continuum would be absolute peace. Never actually attained, but approached. Epitomized by the relationship between the U.S. and Canada. Open borders, cultures with a large degree of commonality, amicable relationship at the highest levels of government, little competition between the societies, but rather cooperation.

At the other end of the continuum would be apocalyptic war as perhaps epitomized by a global thermonuclear weaponry exchange of catastrophic proportions between the U.S. and the old Soviet Union.

In between these two opposites lie a whole range of possibilities for war and peace.

One example of a relationship that lies in the peaceful end of the continuum is the relationship between the U.S. and Japan. A state of peace and relative amicability exists while the two nations are in a state of serious international economic competition. The slide on the continuum is moving here from the peaceful absolute to a less peaceful state, although not excessively so. No one would rationally suggest that the current peaceful international economic competition between the U.S. and Japan could develop into armed conflict.

An example of where the slide on the continuum has moved far from the peaceful absolute toward the polar opposite [war], was the forty five year "Cold War" between the U.S. and the old Soviet Union. Constant tension, as evidenced by hostile and incompatible ideologies, an arms race, diplomatic wrangling and threats, a constant barrage of propaganda, jostling under the sea by submarines, etc., all these are indicators of a hostile situation that could in very rapid pace have gone from "peace" to "hostile" to a state of extreme shooting war. Competition AND hostility here could reasonably have led to an armed conflict.

The war/peace polar opposite sliding continuum does allow for a much more nuanced understanding of conflict and war. Sees the situation and describes it more clearly.

coolbert.