Dieppe.

This is coolbert:

I have mentioned in previous posts the verity of Trevor De Puy's that defense is the stronger form of combat.

This observation and concept as formulated by Clausewitz from almost two hundred years ago.

On the defense you can accomplish more with less and do so easier than when you are on the offensive.

A perfect example of how defense is the stronger form of combat is the debacle suffered by the Canadian troops at the abortive landings conducted at Dieppe, France, in 1942.

These Canadian troops, again, as mentioned in previous blog entries, were part of the contingents from the white dominions of the British Empire.

Troops of the highest quality, and highly trained as well.

Some would say too well trained and ready for combat. Had languished on the sidelines for two years and had not seen any combat action prior to Dieppe. It was felt prior to the abortive and unsuccessful landings that if any troops could show the way as to how an offensive could be carried out against German forces in occupied France, it would be the Canadians.

This was not to be.

Much has been made over the years that the attack on Dieppe was an ill-planned operation, lacking surprise as the movement from England to France of the invaders was detected and the defenders alerted, and that perhaps the entire operation was not even authorized in the first place. Nonetheless, the German defenders at Dieppe gave a very good account of themselves.

This is where the verity that defense is the stronger form of combat demonstrates itself. The German unit at Dieppe was the 571st Infantry Regiment of the 302nd Division, a category two unit. Meaning that it was manned by Poles [??] and ethnic middle-aged Germans. According to one account this unit was:

"equipped with a motley mixture of horses, bicycles, captured Czech and French guns [including one captured French tank cemented into a sea wall]."

It also seems the German commander [Haase] was a shrewd tactician and deployed his men well and had made excellent defensive contingency plans, siting his antiquated but effective guns with skill, in anticipation [correct as it turned out to be] of where the attackers would land at Dieppe. These guns were so sited that they were invisible to aerial reconnaissance and relatively impervious to supporting fires of the attacking forces.

The results of this battle was a staggering defeat for the attackers.

Highly motivated, trained, and ready-to-get-into-the-action Canadian troops were soundly defeated by second rate German troops equipped with second rate weaponry. Superior leadership for the Germans with sound planning had allowed the defenders to carry the day.

How soundly did the Germans carry the day? Colonel John Hughes-Wilson says this about Dieppe:

"Of the 5,000 men who were in the force, 2,700 were killed, wounded or captured. As only 4,000 of the attackers go ashore, this meant a casualty rate of 60 %: worse even than that benchmark of loss, the first day of the Somme in 1916."

It is said that every August 19 in years subsequent to 1942, General Roberts, the Canadian General in command at Dieppe, would receive in the mail a box containing a stale piece of cake [this practice evidently continued for a number of years after the war had ended]. Roberts had allegedly said prior to the attack, "It will be a piece of cake!!"

coolbert.