Fabius IV.

This is coolbert:

Bert responds to Fabius again:

"Mao's version of 4GW, now 60 years old, called for a phase 3 of conventional military war. What we think of 4GW brought his movement from nothing to military victory."

"The 'classic' three-phase Maoist model"

"In China, the Maoist Theory of People's War divides warfare into three phases. In Phase One, the guerrillas earn the population's support by distributing propaganda and attacking the organs of government. In the Phase Two, escalating attacks are launched against the government's military forces and vital institutions. In Phase Three, conventional warfare and fighting are used to seize cities, overthrow the government, and assume control of the country."

"Mao brought 4GW to maturity, not perfection. In the generations since then phase 3 has been proven unneccessary for victory."

A three stage revolutionary war was called for in the "teachings" of Mao. These stages would be:

* Stage One. Incipient guerrilla warfare. Preparation for war, but not actual hostilities.

* Stage Two. Guerrilla warfare as it is understood in the classical sense. Five to ten man squads roaming the countryside, attacking government forces at will. Surviving and blending in with the local populace at will!

* Stage Three. Conventional warfare. Guerrilla bands coalescing into ever larger units [squad/platoon/company/battalion]. Battalion size units usually be sufficient to topple the "central government".

"In the generations since then phase 3 has been proven unneccessary for victory."

Fabius is absolutely correct here!

Two examples from fairly recent times demonstrate that is true.

* The Cuban revolution [1958] headed by Fidel Castro and Che Guevara.

* The Sandanista rebellion [1979] that toppled Anastasio Somoza in Nicaragua.

In both cases, the "rebels" won with miniscule guerrilla forces numbering ONLY several hundred fighters. Neither instance was as it was in China, a "Peoples War" as theorized by Mao. There was never a need to organize into platoon/company/battalion size "main force" units. The small squads [5-10 fighters max] of dedicated cadres' were all that was needed in both cases.

"During this time [1956-1958], Castro's forces were quite small, at times less than 200 men"

Batista [Cuba] and Somoza [Nicaragua] were typical Latin-American "strong men". Conditions under their rule were despotic. An internal rot festered to the point that "a good swift kick and the whole rotten mess came tumbling down!!"

[paraphrasing A. Hitler.]

coolbert.