Thoughts on the military and military activities of a diverse nature. Free-ranging and eclectic.

Sunday, July 23, 2006

Sideshow?



This is coolbert:

In his book "Military Intelligence Blunders", the British retired officer Colonel John Hughes-Wilson makes a startling assertion.

An assertion that the casual reader would not probably appreciate.

The assertion is that the attack [on Pearl Harbor] by the Japanese that brought America into World War Two [WW2] was a mere sideshow to further operations by Japanese forces in "southern waters".

A sideshow??!!

How could this be so??!!

After all, the Japanese DID assemble an enormous fleet for the Pearl Harbor operation. A assemblage of aircraft carriers hitherto never seen or ever even contemplated.

A striking force of great power, that was used ruthlessly and without hesitation.

[this was the kido butai!!]

Even the good Colonel questions his own assertion!

"This fact comes as a slightly shocking revelation to many observers. After all, was it not Pearl Harbor that dragged the USA into the Second World War and turned an essentially European quarrel into a global conflict?"

And yet, Hughes-Wilson seems to be right on the money.

[Well, he is a retired military intelligence officer of ability!]

Pearl Harbor was politically important, but militarily NOT as important as those further military operations of the Japanese directed against Malaya, the Philippines, and the Dutch East Indies.

"Hard though it is to accept, Pearl Harbor was NOT the main Japanese target on 7 December 1941. The merest glance at the balance of Japanese forces deployed in the Pacific during the first week of December 1941 shows that only a fraction of Japanese power was dedicated to neutralizing the US fleet."

The main goal of Japanese forces in the days just after the attack on Pearl harbor was the capture and occupation of territories in "southern waters", mainly Malaya and the Dutch East Indies, for the exploitation of natural resources. Those resources such as rubber, tin, and OIL.

Attacks against the Philippines would be for the purpose of eliminating American forces in the area that had the potentiality to interfere with Japanese efforts in "southern waters". The American garrisons in the Philippines too had to be defeated as a part of successful conquest, occupation, and exploitation.

This emphasis by the Japanese on the "southern operations" was FULLY RECOGNIZED BY ALLIED MILITARY LEADERS IN THE DAYS PRIOR TO PEARL HARBOR!!

[this would include the Americans, British, and Dutch.]

Allied intelligence experts did recognize this threat.

"This was inevitably reflected in the number of messages [radio] intercepted by the American and British [and Dutch too]. The greater part of the traffic [radio] was taken up with events in the South-West Pacific, and Asia, and staff interest in the US fleet at anchorage appeared to be minimal or non-existent.]

"The salient fact about the intelligence disaster at Pearl Harbor is that most of the evidence was hidden by a blizzard of other information at the time. This masking of vital indicator in an overall level of other signals is called "noise" by professional intelligence officers. Quite simply, the clamor of other voices drowned out the Pearl Harbor material."

Furthermore, according to Colonel Hughes-Wilson, and this is germane to 9/11 and WTC too:

"After any surprise attack it is relatively easy to go back over the evidence and pick out he crucial indicators".

Yes!! All that second-guessing done after 9/11 was done by folks that could easily pick out the indications of the attack as they already knew what to look for and what was the significance of what they were looking for.

I recommend this book by Hughes-Wilson highly. Each and every time you read and re-read passages, you pick up on something you had not realized before. Such as what I have just described!

[let me conclude by saying that a lot of folks feel it was a major mistake on the part of the Japanese naval commander Nagumo NOT to have had follow-up attacks on Pearl Harbor. Further attacks would have weakened the U.S. fleet even MORE. Perhaps part of the thinking on the part of Nagumo is that he did not want the kido butai endangered in any manner as it could possibly be needed for more VITAL operations in "southern waters" at a future time. My speculation!]

coolbert.

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