Gonen II.
This is coolbert:
Conclusion!
"Gorodish"
Another comment has been made with regard to the conflict in the 1973 Yom Kippur/Ramadan war between Sharon and Gonen:
"Based on the previous post & w/o checking, I assumed General Gonen was sound, of average ability and performance, willing to strike hard, keep striking and not be dilatory, with a difficult brilliant subordinate. That Ariel Sharon preceded him at Southern Command or that the Peter principle might apply didn't occur to me. If anything, General Gonen should have been taken away from troops faster. I was wrong."
"General Gonen should have been taken away from troops faster"
I think that it is safe to say that this will be a point of contention as long as the subject is debated.
Gonen was in all probability a sound commander at lower echelons who DID find himself over his head at higher levels of command. In the first most crucial days of the 1973 war, through no fault of his own, he WAS a victim of the "fog of war". He had to make decisions based upon faulty and imprecise intelligence and appreciations of the situation.
THE ISRAELI WAS CAUGHT WITH THEIR PANTS DOWN. NO DOUBT ABOUT IT. THIS FOR THEM WAS A VERY TRAUMATIC AND UNACCUSTOMED POSITION TO BE IN. TACTICS THAT IN THE PREVIOUS WARS OF 1956 AND 1967, SUCH AS THE "TANK CHARGE", NO LONGER WORKED. SUCH TACTICS WOULD ALMOST ALWAYS CAUSE PANIC AMONG THE ARAB FORCES AND LEAD TO QUICK AND EASY VICTORY FOR THE ISRAELI. THIS DID NOT HAPPEN IN 1973.
Dayan and Sharon had for the period of twenty years prior to 1973, a close working relationship and a combat style that was similar. That is one reason Dayan placed Sharon in charge of Unit 101 in the first place.
Sharon advocated the "tank charge" and crossing of the canal at a time when SUCH A MOVE WOULD HAVE BEEN TOO RISKY GIVEN THE EXISTING CIRCUMSTANCES AT THE TIME. This must have been the thoughts of Gonen. Dayan saw Sharon as being a "can-do" man and did not think of Gonen in the same manner.
Having had Sharon as HIS PREVIOUS COMMANDER IN SOUTHERN COMMAND MUST NOT have helped matters at all either for Gonen. Such a relationship too COULD NOT HAVE BEEN helpful or desirable. But did exist. To the detriment of Gonen.
Gonen for no other reason should have been relieved as his own PERSONAL CONFIDENCE HAD TO HAVE GONE DOWNFALL IN A VERY ADVERSE WAY, AND FAST TOO!! His command ability was forever damaged.
coolbert.
Another comment has been made with regard to the conflict in the 1973 Yom Kippur/Ramadan war between Sharon and Gonen:
"Based on the previous post & w/o checking, I assumed General Gonen was sound, of average ability and performance, willing to strike hard, keep striking and not be dilatory, with a difficult brilliant subordinate. That Ariel Sharon preceded him at Southern Command or that the Peter principle might apply didn't occur to me. If anything, General Gonen should have been taken away from troops faster. I was wrong."
"General Gonen should have been taken away from troops faster"
I think that it is safe to say that this will be a point of contention as long as the subject is debated.
Gonen was in all probability a sound commander at lower echelons who DID find himself over his head at higher levels of command. In the first most crucial days of the 1973 war, through no fault of his own, he WAS a victim of the "fog of war". He had to make decisions based upon faulty and imprecise intelligence and appreciations of the situation.
THE ISRAELI WAS CAUGHT WITH THEIR PANTS DOWN. NO DOUBT ABOUT IT. THIS FOR THEM WAS A VERY TRAUMATIC AND UNACCUSTOMED POSITION TO BE IN. TACTICS THAT IN THE PREVIOUS WARS OF 1956 AND 1967, SUCH AS THE "TANK CHARGE", NO LONGER WORKED. SUCH TACTICS WOULD ALMOST ALWAYS CAUSE PANIC AMONG THE ARAB FORCES AND LEAD TO QUICK AND EASY VICTORY FOR THE ISRAELI. THIS DID NOT HAPPEN IN 1973.
Dayan and Sharon had for the period of twenty years prior to 1973, a close working relationship and a combat style that was similar. That is one reason Dayan placed Sharon in charge of Unit 101 in the first place.
Sharon advocated the "tank charge" and crossing of the canal at a time when SUCH A MOVE WOULD HAVE BEEN TOO RISKY GIVEN THE EXISTING CIRCUMSTANCES AT THE TIME. This must have been the thoughts of Gonen. Dayan saw Sharon as being a "can-do" man and did not think of Gonen in the same manner.
Having had Sharon as HIS PREVIOUS COMMANDER IN SOUTHERN COMMAND MUST NOT have helped matters at all either for Gonen. Such a relationship too COULD NOT HAVE BEEN helpful or desirable. But did exist. To the detriment of Gonen.
Gonen for no other reason should have been relieved as his own PERSONAL CONFIDENCE HAD TO HAVE GONE DOWNFALL IN A VERY ADVERSE WAY, AND FAST TOO!! His command ability was forever damaged.
coolbert.
Labels: Israel
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