Infantry-Square.

This is coolbert:

Here is an interesting idea regarding TO&E from the era of World War Two [WW2].

As used by the U.S. Marines during that conflict. A structure for infantry, the organization of which allows for sustained combat of a high intensity for a prolonged period without exhausting the troops to the point where they become combat-fatigued and are no longer "effectives".

The infantry-square!

The "infantry-square" concept has a lot of merit to it.

This is clearly enunciated in an article by the editor of the G2mil web site.

According to the editor - - Carlton Meyer of G2mil: [quoting in entirety to large extent]

"The Infantry square - -

Few infantry officers understand how to manage sustained close combat operations, like those found in urban environments and dense terrain where progress is measured by meters a day. This heavily favors defense since ambushes and booby traps are easy to employ. Advances are slow to minimize casualties since few armies are willing to employ suicidal "banzai" charges. The most effective method is for grunts to dash forward a few meters at a time while others provide cover fire and attempt to locate enemy shooters."

"Infantry leaders instinctively employ all their forces into the attack hoping to overwhelm the enemy. However, locating and destroying an entrenched and concealed enemy requires patience, especially if they move about within buildings, tunnels and sewers [three dimensional warfare]. Infantry officers must accept this constraint, and understand that infantrymen will no longer advance after 48 hours of close combat due to fatigue and a lack of decent food, sleep, and sanitation. In addition, heavy casualties convince survivors that death is imminent since fighting never ends."

"This is rarely understood because peacetime urban warfare and assault course training lasts just a few hours [and the aspect of fear is missing. As Dupuy would state, training exercises can never emulate totally combat as the element of fear is missing. NO ONE is shooting back at you to kill you!!]. In addition, sustained close combat is quite different from open warfare where units maneuver and rest between battles [if you are severely outnumbered and on the defensive, there may not be time for maneuver and rest. YOU MAY have to beat a retreat delaying. That is to say, movement by fire to the rear, while in contact with the enemy. Breaking contact may be next to impossible. Sustained long term combat will not allow for rest at ALL!!]. As a result, the US Army encountered difficulties during World War II . . . but most divisions never developed a method of maintaining a grinding offensive momentum. "

[it should also understood that training NEVER constitutes preparation for combat in the total sense. Should be understood as a preparation where learning methods, techniques, and tactics is the goal!! With the element of fear missing, combat just cannot be emulated!! This is intuitive!!]

"In the Pacific, US Marine Corps assaults into island fortifications taught them to develop a rotational system. The basic model is the infantry battalion square; two companies forward, two behind them, with the battalion headquarters and support elements in the middle. Two rifle companies fight and advance for 48 hours, then the two rear companies move forward to relieve them in place. The two fatigued companies move to the rear to eat hot chow, "use" toilet paper, receive medical care for minor injuries, hopefully get a few beers, then sleep. The next day its more hot chow, weapons cleaning, bathing and more sleep. These rearward companies also provide the battalion with defense-in-depth should the enemy mount a major counterattack and punch through a forward company."

"Since these companies return to their approximate areas, they are familiar with the battlefield and this break allows planning for the upcoming 48-hour combat phase. Replacements can be added and broken or lost equipment replaced. As they move back into the line, they are refreshed and fully equipped to fight, with the comfort of knowing they will be pulled back after 48 hours. This rotational arrangement allowed Marine Corps infantry battalions to conduct sustained offensive close combat operations for weeks . . . Attached supporting elements rotated with their rifle companies or as directed by the battalion staff . . . . Since battles are fluid, it is difficult for infantry commanders to accept their offensive has slowed into a close combat grind. They must recognize when battalions should form an infantry battalion square, before their grunts stop completely. This is not only good for combat success, but for morale as well. Tired, hungry and dirty soldiers cannot advance against strong enemy defenses. The infantry square is not really a tactic, just common sense."

Common sense indeed!! Leave it to the Marines!!

Having an infantry square TO&E from the get-go will allow the Ghurkha brigade commander to use such a method in combat, whether on the offensive or defensive, in a conventional battlefield environment or otherwise [urban warfare].

coolbert.