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Friday, February 17, 2006

Plain of Reeds.

This is coolbert:

There WAS another battle in the early days of American involvement in Vietnam that showed how American technology and "know-how" would not always carry the day.

The battle in question here is not Ap Bac, but rather the Battle of the Plain of Reeds.

[some folks may quibble that Ap Bac IS located also in the area called The Plain of Reeds. I would state that Ap Bac is a distinctive engagement. The Battle of the Plain of Reeds is also distinctive!!]

As was Ap Bac, also occurred in 1962.

And also involved the M113 APC [armored personnel carrier].

As has been mentioned, it was felt in the early days of American involvement in Vietnam, that all what was required was some superior American equipment and superior American military know-how, and the communist insurgency would soon be over.

This was the belief, at any rate.

Before going further, let me say that the M113 was not intended to be an infantry fighting vehicle [IFV]. A vehicle that would BOTH transport and allow for a fighting capacity. The M113 was seen by the U.S. military as being what is called a "battle taxi". Transport infantry troops across all sorts of terrain. Take the infantry to the battle. Provide protection against small arms fire and shrapnel fragments from enemy indirect fire. NOT a vehicle the infantry was intended to fight from. Infantry would dismount a distance from the objective and conduct a conventional infantry assault.

This WAS the WAY American commanders had been trained and had practiced in using the M113.

The M113 DID have a fifty caliber machine gun mounted on it. Was to be employed by the track commander [TC]. Usually the squad leader of the infantry squad being transported by the APC. This TC manning that fifty caliber WAS susceptible to enemy fire in a big way as he was so exposed with his torso sticking out of the hatch on the top of the APC.

See the below photo where this is plainly seen.




Concentrated enemy fire directed at the TC, as was seen at AP Bac, would stall an assault by the M113's employed by the South Vietnamese. With a certain percentage of the TC's dead or wounded, leadership would break down and the other enlisted would not move forward on their own initiative.

At the Plain of Reeds, the South Vietnamese DID attempt to use the M113 as an IFV. Troops would NOT dismount, but attempt to assault and overrun the Viet Cong [VC] position, while fighting from inside the APC. It was possible for the South Vietnamese to do this, regardless of what American "advisors told them. A hatch on the top of the APC could be opened, allowing the infantrymen to remain within and fire over the top of the APC at enemy targets, while still protected inside the M113.

Read the account of the "Battle of the Plain of Reeds" by clicking here:

"the APC's charged straight ahead through the flooded paddies toward the point where the Viet Cong had last been seen. Suddenly, enemy soldiers appeared all around the APC's, some firing automatic weapons and rifles and others running wildly in an attempt to evade the armored vehicles. As the APC's scattered the enemy, the South Vietnamese soldiers fired in all directions from the open hatches, with the .50-caliber machine guns dominating the fight.

After much discussion, Captain Bricker persuaded Captain Ba to order his troops to dismount, but this move proved to be a serious mistake. As long as the troops were mounted and moving the Viet Cong had been unable to fire well-aimed shots. Dismounted, the soldiers not only lost the advantages of movement, cover, and observation aforded by their APC's but they also found themselves bogged down in water that was knee-deep."

From this account, it is apparent that the attack by the APC's only failed WHEN THE AMERICAN ADVISOR ON THE SCENE GAVE ERRANT ADVICE TO HIS SOUTH VIETNAMESE COUNTERPART. Those South Vietnamese infantrymen, when dismounting from the M113's, found themselves in knee deep mud, could move forward only with the greatest difficulty, were exposed to VC fire, and were cut down with ease by the enemy!!

THE ADVICE GIVEN BY THE AMERICAN ADVISOR WAS NO GOOD!!!

[please note that at this point, the VC forces evidently DID NOT possess anti-armor weapons such as recoilless rifles or the rocket propelled grenade [RPG].]

After this engagement, the South Vietnamese made expedient but very successful modifications to their American provided M113's. This was done at their [the South Vietnamese] own initiative. These modifications were:

* Provide armor protection with a gun shield for the TC manning the fifty caliber machine gun.

* Mount two [2] thirty caliber Browning machine guns on the APC. One gun to cover the left quadrant, the other to cover the right quadrant.

* Revise doctrine used by the SOUTH VIETNAMESE to allow troops to fight from inside the APC to the greatest extent possible. Use the M113 as an armored troop carrier AND a fighting vehicle.

"The application of what was then American doctrine, which called for mechanized troops to dismount and assault the objective on foot, caused the attack to falter. Because of this experience, attacks in the future were conducted with troops fighting from the carriers. The M113 quickly became a combat vehicle, used almost as a light tank. Eventually, American units adopted this doctrine and fought mounted.2 "

ARMOR VEHICLES SUCH AS THE M113 COULD BE USED IN VIETNAM SUCCESSFULLY IF THE RIGHT MEASURES WERE TAKEN. CONTRARY TO POPULAR BELIEF, ARMOR COULD BE AND DID BECOME AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE WAR EFFORT!!

IT IS very interesting that when the U.S. Army became involved in the Vietnam War in a BIG way, armored cavalry regiments were sent to Vietnam as part of the American forces. These units [the ACAV] incorporated the "lessons learned" by the South Vietnamese and WERE very successful in combat against the VC and the North Vietnamese Army [NVA].

coolbert.

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