Schlieffen Plan.

This is coolbert:

"In time of peace, prepare for war" - - - Cicero.

"The plan is the base from which all change is made" - - - Israeli General.

"Be bold" - - - Von Schlieffen.

"But not too bold" - - - Von Moltke [the Younger].

During times of peace, the General Staffs of armies throughout the world make preparations and plans for the next war.

Following the Prussian victory over France in 1870, the European powers DID BEGIN to make plans for the next general European war. A general war of an intensity and scale that was to not have been seen in Europe since the time of Napoleon.

In this regard, the General Staff of the newly unified Germany was not unique in planning for and making ready for a general European war.

Upon ascending to Chief of the German General Staff, Count Alfred Von Schlieffen, by all accounts a genius in an organization of geniuses, was faced with a dilemma for which there seemed no answer.

This dilemma was a result of Entente alliance between Britain, France, and Russia. An alliance that feared an expansionist and robust Germany. A Germany that was confident and aspired to European domination.

The Entente alliance would require Germany to fight a two front war. One front in the west against the French, the second front in the east against the Russian. This would not allow for Germany to WIN a general war. Germany could FIGHT such a war, but could NOT WIN! This alliance WAS FELT AT THE TIME to be a deterrent to war.

Von Schlieffen did give considerable thought to this dilemma facing the German Army, and DID devise a solution.

This of course became known as the Schlieffen Plan. [Planning first began in 1891 and the plan was NOT formally adopted until 1906. Von Schlieffen was Chief of Staff during that entire time [15 years!! That one man would be the Chief of Staff of any army in the world would be unheard of today!!]]

The Schlieffen plan envisaged a general war with Germany first delivering a knockout blow to the French Army. A knockout blow that would take a very swift course. A knockout blow that would entail the German Army to first array a vast preponderance of it's forces against France. A very swift knockout blow that would then allow the German Army to rapidly redeploy the preponderance of it's forces against a slowly mobilizing and sluggish Russian Army. A sluggish and slow Russian Army that the Germans could then in turn defeat at their leisure.

The Schlieffen Plan would consist of 90 % of the main German Army striking force first being arrayed against France. Of that force mobilized against the French, 90 % in turn would be placed in a right wing that would execute a vast turning movement, advancing through Holland, Belgium, northern France, west of Paris, finally turning east to encircle the French Army in what U.S. military experts would call a "hammer and anvil".

Click here to see a map that shows this vast turning movement.

"wing - - (DOD) 4. A flank unit; that part of a military force to the right or left of the main body."

"envelopment - - (DOD, NATO) An offensive maneuver in which the main attacking
force passes around or over the enemy's principal defensive positions to secure objectives to the enemy's rear. See also turning movement."

"turning movement - - (DOD, NATO) A variation of the envelopment in which the attacking force passes around or over the enemy's principal defensive positions to secure objectives deep in the enemy's rear to force the enemy to abandon his position or divert major forces to meet the threat."

[The hammer in this case would be the 90 % advancing through France. The anvil would be the remaining 10 % of the German Army that would fight a defensive battle on the French-German border. French forces caught between the "hammer and anvil" would be encircled, not have a possibility or resupply or maneuver, and would be annihilated.]

[The German force advancing through Holland, Belgium, and France is often referred to as the "right wing" To refer to this German force as a "wing", by modern definition, is erroneous. This WAS the main body of the German Army. Does not meet the criteria of what a "wing" is as generally understood.]

[The remaining 10 % of the German Army would be deployed against any Russian army units that might advance into East Prussia. These German troops were to fight strictly a defensive action.]

Von Schlieffen devised his operational plan based upon a number of assumptions. These assumptions were:

The German Army would be of expanded size when a general war in Europe would begin. Additional units would be available to create the preponderance of force necessary for the wheeling movement of the German army right wing to succeed.

The Russian Army would take six weeks to mobilize. It would take both the Germans and the French two weeks to mobilize.

"Mobilize - - (DOD) 1. The act of assembling and organizing national resources to support national objectives in time of war or other emergencies. "

The British would not intervene in the general European war if Belgian neutrality was violated. [the treaty between Britain and Belgium guaranteeing neutrality of the latter was written in 1839!!].

The Belgian military would either NOT resist a German advance through Belgian territory, or if the Belgians did resist, Belgian forts blocking the German advance would be captured by German coup de main at the beginning of the war. In any case, the German advance would NOT BE impeded by any efforts of the Belgians.

"coup de main - - (DOD) An offensive operation that capitalizes on surprise and simultaneous execution of supporting operations to achieve success in one swift stroke."

These assumptions of Von Schlieffen were to be proven WRONG!!

[It may very well be that when these assumptions were made, they were valid. But remember that the operational plan of Von Schlieffen was first conceived in 1891 and became THE plan in 1905. Between 1905 and 1914 things in all probability changed drastically from what was the situation when Von Schlieffen began his planning. REMEMBER, the plan is the BASE from which all change is made!!]

Von Schlieffen's plan was inspired and had considerable merit to it. And was a reflection of the genius of Von Schlieffen, a genius in an organization of geniuses.

So considerable is the merit to the Von Schlieffen plan, that no less authority that Dupuy states that if Von Schlieffen was in command of German forces in 1914, it is hard to see how the plan could not have succeeded!!

And yet, the Schlieffen Plan, a modified version of it being implemented in 1914, did NOT succeed. The French Army in 1914 was NOT annihilated. For a variety of reasons, the "right wing" of the main striking force of the German Army did NOT advance west of Paris and then swing east. The advance of the "right wing" was repelled. A stalemate resulted that lasted for four years. Rapid, decisive victory was NOT had. Why was this??

As has been said, a MODIFIED version of the Schlieffen Plan was implemented in 1914.

Modification evidently began under the auspices of the successor to Von Schlieffen, Von Moltke [the Younger], the nephew of the great Von Moltke, commander of the Prussians in their victory over the French in 1870.

Von Schlieffen evidently was aware of the modifications being made and protested in an anonymous letter that was circulated prior to his death.

These modifications were designed to DECREASE the BOLDNESS of the Schlieffen plan. Rather than 90 % of the German striking force arrayed against the French being concentrated in the "right wing", only 66 % was to be in the modified plan.

Great emphasis was placed on defending the border directly between France and Germany. And this emphasis was not without foundation.

Plan XVII, the FRENCH operational plan for war with Germany, called for the French Army to attack with massive force on the boundary between France and Germany [to cover the "lost" provinces of Alsace and Lorraine]. This French plan, while playing into the hands of the German Schlieffen Plan, perhaps unbeknownst to the Germans, did necessitate additional German forces to successfully contain a French advance!! A successful German border defense DID need more troops on the scene. Troops that were taken from that "right wing".

[All this concern with the border between France and Germany presupposes a foreknowledge on the part of German General Staff that indeed, the French would attack with massive force in the border area. Whether the German DID have foreknowledge of this is unknown to me. It maybe that this was merely prudence based upon inference that was logical and sound.]

[This modification of the Schlieffen Plan began in 1909 [??]. The modifications supposedly authored by, according to rumor, by Ludendorff. Now, Ludendorff was no slouch as a military planner.

DID understand very well the operational art. Ludendorff was the Chief of Staff for Hindenberg during the German victory over the Russians at Tannenberg in 1914. Also oversaw, again as the Chief of Staff for Hindenberg, the German offensives on the Western Front in 1918. Offensives that nearly succeeded. Ludendorff DID know what he was doing. Any modifications to the Schlieffen Plan done by Ludendorff I would have to assume were done FOR-A-REASON!!]

"operational art - - (DOD) The employment of military forces to attain strategic and/or
operational objectives"

And those erroneous assumptions of Von Schlieffen??

At the time, those assumptions MAY have been totally valid. Were found later NOT to be!!

The German Army was NOT expanded to the degree that Von Schlieffen would have desired. Additional troops WERE NOT available to bolster the strength of the "right wing".

Britain DID enter the war over the violation of Belgian neutrality.

[Dutch territory was not violated by the Germans, the route of march of the "right wing" having been modified, evidently also by the planning of Ludendorff. It is suggested that the inclusion of Dutch territory as a route of march for the "right wing" in the first place was done at the behest of German nationalists. For what reasons I am not sure? Surely a man of the stature of Von Schlieffen followed his own conception for the "grand sweep" on military necessity and was not swayed by politics??!! At least, I would have thought not!!]

The Belgian Army did put up a spirited but futile defense of their territory. The German Army did have to deploy and take into account Belgian action. The forts of Liege had to be reduced by siege and the use of great caliber siege mortars.

The Russian Army WAS able to mobilize and deploy it's forces in four weeks. NOT the six weeks that Von Schlieffen had believed was likely. The Russian Army DID invade German East Prussia. An unexpected invasion that caused an emotional response from the German.

It can be seen that there was a synergistic effect here.

"Synergy - - The interaction of two or more agents or forces so that their combined effect is greater than the sum of their individual effects."

German force manning were not adequate to provide for the proper strength of the "right wing" as desired by Von Schlieffen.

Belgian defense of their homeland slowed down the German advance. The German was forced to deploy to overcome unexpected resistance. This resistance was readily overcome. But DELAY was undeniable.

British involvement also caused delay to the advancing "right wing". It can be argued that British troop strength was not adequate to delay the German advance in a MARKED way. But delay again is undeniable.

Perhaps most important, the rapidity with which the Russian advanced into East Prussia, dealing defeat to the German defender, cannot be denied either.

This rapid Russian advance necessitated the transfer of 200,000 troops from the "right wing" on the western front, and the redeployment of same to meet and stem the Russian. [This redeployment was to an extent an emotional response to the violation of GERMAN territory. Territory that held a special significance for German commanders of Prussian ancestry. East Prussia held the same "sacred" significance for the German that Alsace-Lorraine held for the French.]

What is the synergistic effect here? The value of the individual parts would be:

A smaller than desired "right wing" = 1.

Unexpected Belgian resistance = 1.

Unexpected British resistance = 1.

Redeployment of troops to the eastern front = 2.

Sum of the individual parts is:

1+1+1+2=5.

Synergistic sum is:

1+1+1+2=8.

Is Dupuy therefore wrong when he says the Von Schlieffen plan could have failed if Von Schlieffen was commanding in 1914?

YES and NO!!

YES if all of Von Schlieffen's assumptions had proven to be correct.

NO if Von Schlieffen's assumptions were proven to be wrong.

The assumption made by Von Schlieffen from 1891 till 1905 MAY HAVE been valid at the time. Were NOT valid in 1914. A new plan was necessitated. A new plan that perhaps Von Schlieffen would have approved of, if new circumstances were made known to him!!

[In addition, the "right wing" had two commanders, Von Kluck [pronounced Klook] and Von Bulow, whose temperaments were at odds with one another. The former was more aggressive in his march than was the latter. This created "rifts" in the march that the allied forces were able to take advantage of during "The Miracle on the Marne". "Rifts" that could have been patched by superior German headquarters taking cognizance of the matter and exercising proper control over. This WAS NOT done!!]

coolbert.