Korean War.

This is coolbert:

Good program on public television last night about the Korean War. Was well done and touched on many topics that have been mentioned in this blog before. Some of the material covered included:

The imperviousness of the Soviet T-34 tank being used by the North Koreans to U.S. anti-tank weapons. Not artillery, aircraft, or the World War Two [WW2] bazooka could stop the T-34.

The lack of forward air controllers [FAC] on the ground in the early stage of the war severely hampered close air support [CAS] by U.S. and Australian pilots to friendly ground forces. Pilots with ordnance were on the scene of the fighting, but did not know exactly where the enemy was. These pilots on a number of occasions dropped their bomb loads on friendly forces. It was not until a trained FAC was on the scene, on the ground, with radio, directing CAS that bombing became effective against the North Korean forces.

The first U.S. division on the scene of the fighting, the 24th Division, was not even at brigade strength when it deployed to Korea. A normal division would have a complement of anywhere from 10,000 to 15,000 personnel. The 24th Division had only 4,000 men available for deployment. NOT even a brigade strong.

Task Force Smith, the first U.S. unit to encounter in combat the North Koreans, WAS also severely undermanned. Consisted of only 400 men. And they had been in constant transit [4 days] to the battle front prior to their first combat with the North Koreans. Those men had to be exhausted from just getting to the battle front in the first place. NOT to include being outgunned, outnumbered, untrained, etc. NOT a unit you would want to send into battle, period!! In the TV program, it is reputed that Task Force Smith faced 5,000 North Koreans and a regiment of tanks. That is a much larger enemy force than what I was aware of. Perhaps correct, perhaps not. Hard to tell with numbers.

The same set of circumstances repeated itself over and over during the retreat of the 24th Division to what became the Pusan perimeter. Units of the 24th would dig into to defend against advancing North Korean units. But would find themselves suddenly outflanked and bypassed over and over. These bypassed and outflanked defenders would have to abandon their defenses and retreat southward. This happened over and over. And tank fright was a common occurrence for U.S. troops facing the T-34. Well, when you are an infantryman and you do NOT have the weapons to fight a tank, you are in big trouble.

By the time the Pusan perimeter was established, and the 24th Division had made a successful retreat to the enclave, the U.S. had more troops inside the perimeter than the North Koreans had outside. This is not that significant. The U.S. troops were on the defensive, the North Koreans on the offensive. The former had to guard with equal strength along the entire perimeter of the enclave. The North Koreans by being on the offensive choose the place and time of the attack and could mass their forces at will.

Mac Arthur really gambled in a big way with the Inchon landing. Ships had to deploy all the way the Mediterranean for the landings!! And there was only ONE day in September when the tides would be appropriate for any assault to take place. If the landings were not accomplished on that one day in September, the next possible time for landings would be in October, one month later. Thankfully, for Mac Arthur the Navy and Marines did not let him down.


When the Chinese made their appearance into the Korean War for the first time, U.S. intelligence had estimated that 60,000 Chinese troops were deployed in Korea. The actual number was 380,000!!!??? Somebody really messed up here. And of course, the Chinese were masters at camouflage, concealment, cross country and night movement to mask their movement.

[This included the setting of deliberate forest fires in North Korea on a massive basis. To create smoke and haze that would obfuscate U.S. reconnaissance aircraft.]

When the MIG-15 entered aerial combat in the skies over the Korea, it WAS proven to be superior to American jets of the time, until the Sabrejet [F-86] came along. Stalin had his own pilots flying the MIG's, but did not allow them to make aerial attacks upon U.S. ground forces.

At the beginning of the Chinese offensives in Korea, it MUST have seemed to American troops that the Chinese were some sort of supermen, unstoppable and irresistible. But this was not the case. The Chinese did have weaknesses. This was found from interrogation of POW's. Supply problems and general suffering and hardship were endured by the Chinese, to their detriment. NO army is unstoppable and irresistible.

[The shock created by the Chinese advance must have had a big impact upon American senior officers. The experiences that American commanders and officers had with Chinese troops during World War Two [WW2] was mostly negative. The Chinese DID not make good soldiers and their army was NOT GOOD. The Chinese were good as defensive troops, but did not have an outstanding offensive ability. That in Korea they now DID know how to go on the offensive, and in a big way, MUST have been a big shock to senior U.S. commanders.]

Chinese troops and their mass wave attacking tactics could be countered, and were, by the use of massive firepower, primarily artillery, centrally controlled. This was called the "meat grinder". Every firing piece of indirect fire weaponry within range of an attack could be brought to bear in quick fashion against the attacking Chinese.

Seoul was captured and recaptured four times in less than a year. Was totally destroyed in the process. Seoul is and has had tremendous emotional significance for the Korean people. Everybody wants it!! It does have value as a military target!!

The Chinese spring offensive of 1951 WAS lavishly equipped with artillery and tanks supplied by the Soviet Union. But the Chinese offensive came to naught. Chinese troops were undertrained. The American and other forces were all too well prepared. General Van Fleet executed a "rolling defense" that did not allow for friendly forces to be enveloped, outflanked, and bypassed. He [Van Fleet] was successful with his defensive plan.

coolbert.