This is coolbert: During the first month of the First World War, the army of the Austro-Hungarian Empire put into effect a revised version of Plan Three. This plan was the pre-war operational plan [OPLAN] for an attack on Serbia in case of eventual war. When the war came, the plan, calling for an offensive against the kingdom of the Serbs, was put into effect, with little or no results. In the subsequent years of the war, the Austro-Hungarian general staff devised new OPLANS for offensives against the Serbs. All these offensives also had little effect and were uniformly unsuccessful. The Austro-Hungarian staff began to consider reasons why they had failure after failure. To the Austro-Hungarian staff, it just seemed that the Serbs knew in advance everything the Austro-Hungarian army was going to do? The Serbs were always ready with counters for whatever the Austro-Hungarian army could throw against them.

Now, the Serbs did have a good idea of what the Austro-Hungarian army was going to do!

In the years prior to the war, a certain Colonel Reidl, the
counter-intelligence chief of the Austro-Hungarian general staff, had been a spy for the Russians, and had revealed all he knew to the Russians, including the entire Plan Three!! Plan Three was the result of thousands of man hours of work by the Austro-Hungarian general staff and was said to the ultimate expression of that staffs competence and ability. All the principles, doctrine, strategy, tactics, etc., as understood by the Austro-Hungarian general staff were incorporated into Plan Three. Having this plan compromised was a very serious blow to the war plans of the Austro-Hungarians.

"The commander-in-chief [Conrad] is said to have perceptibly aged in a few moments, for Plan three was the ultimate expression of the technical and tactical skill of himself and his staff."

Having found their Plan Three compromised, revisions were made and a new plan devised. This new plan, however, did not in all likelihood vary to that marked of a degree from the original, the basic conditions facing the Austro-Hungarian general staff just did not change that much to warrant drastic change. Modifications yes, but drastic change NO!

"Years of thought and strategical study had gone into it [Plan Three]; you might modify it here and there, but the main features could hardly be changed."

"Examining Plan Three would have given the Serbian General Staff an X-ray photograph into the best minds of the Austro-Hungarian army."

"for to the last he [General Putnik, commander of the Serb army] had his mind attuned to enemy conceptions of tactics and strategy."

Move forward now to the year 1983. Not so long ago now.

"The U.S. Navy in 1983 dispatched and exceptionally powerful battle group, including three aircraft carriers on an exercise off the Kamchatka Peninsula of the Soviet Union. A principal purpose was to gauge the Soviet reactions to the approach of such a formidable flotilla. The Soviets scarcely reacted at all. Again, as the Admiral said, it was if they possessed a copy of the operational plan, as if they understood exactly what the navy was attempting."

Yes, the Soviets did not respond. They did not need to. It seems the arch traitor, John Walker, had been selling cryptographic information to the Soviets for years prior to 1983. This was of great value to the Soviets. But the Soviets became even more interested when Walker began to provide operational plans [OPLANS] along with the crypto information.

"Walker included the operational plan for a fleet exercise . . . This greatly excited the Soviets . . . By showing precisely how the U.S. Navy organized and deployed itself for battle, the operational plan gave them priceless lessons in the tactics of a modern ocean going fleet . . . A KGB message Walker picked up at the next drop asked for more OPLANS."

Walker was not only betraying crypto information, he was betraying operational plans as well. An analysis of these plans allowed the Soviets an insight to the thinking of U.S. Navy planners just as the betrayal of Plan Three gave the Serbs great insight into the thinking of the Austro-Hungarian general staff.

Well, there you have it, in a nutshell. Betraying OPLANS not only betrays that or those specific OPLANS that have been compromised, it gives your opposition such an insight into your mind that they can anticipate what you are going to do in a given situation and prepare counter measures that will work. Very deadly stuff!

coolbert.