Trinquier!

This is coolbert:

Here is a man whose ideas have had a profound effect upon western military thinkers during the latter half of the 20th century. Ideas and concepts that continue to have a powerful validity, perhaps even more so, to this day.

The Frenchman Roger Trinquier.

Began his adult career as a schoolteacher. Just as did the Vietnamese General Giap. Received a reserve commission [1930] in the French military as an officer in the Regiment Amphibie [French Marines]. Was a member of the detachment of French Marines guarding the French embassy in Peking, China. Learned to speak Chinese during this period, prior to the outbreak of World War Two [WW2].

[several comments here. Evidently the French also used Marines to guard their embassies, as does the United States? It would also be interesting to know if Roger had any contact with the Red Chinese at this time. As an observer, much as was Evans Carlson. I have not seen any references to this.]

Served as a Vichy officer during WW2. French military units in the Far East, i.e. Indo-China, China concession, etc., were considered to be nominally loyal to the fascist cause and were not molested by the Japanese. It was not until the fall of the Vichy regime that the worm turned, Roger and his fellow French soldiers being interned by the Japanese as POW.

[the French Foreign Legion battalion stationed in Indo-China and remaining idle all during WW2 made a three hundred mile fighting march north to link up with Chinese Nationalist forces in 1944. This only after the Battle of France [1944] had ended as a victory for allied forces, De Gaulle assuming power in the aftermath.]

Roger did NOT suffer the same fate as other military officers that had served in the Vichy regime. Was NOT cashiered as having been a collaborator. His abilities were recognized and he continued in his military career. Evidently had protectors at a much higher rank [General Salan?] who saw the man for what he was.

Trinquier did see extensive combat action both in Indo-China [1st Indo-China War], and Algeria. It was this experience that allowed him to formulate his thoughts on MODERN warfare. As opposed to what he referred to as “traditional” warfare.

[traditional warfare according to Trinquier would be war as fought during WW1 and WW2. Massed armies, industrialized, mechanized, by-the-numbers mass production type of war.]

Traditional warfare, as seen by Trinquier, was a thing of the past. NOT the way to go for the future. Remember, these ideas of Trinquier were formulated in the 1950’s. Fifty years ago now. Traditional warfare ala’ WW1 and WW2 was passé. This was due to several reasons, among them being:

* Expense. It was too expensive to conduct warfare as it was done in WW1 and WW2. NO ONE could afford the vast number of ships, planes, and manpower to fight future wars in the mass-production, industrialized, mechanized manner anymore.

* Destructiveness. In the NUCLEAR age, the major world powers, the U.S., the USSR, Red China to a much lesser degree, etc., could NOT afford a direct confrontation. A NUCLEAR war would just be so devastating it would NOT be worth fighting in the first place. Direct confrontation was not desired or wanted. WW3 could not be fought on the same basis as WW1 and WW2.

This did not mean, however, as was emphasized by Trinquier, that warfare itself had become a thing of the past. Rather the contrary. War would NOW be fought by MODERN means. Those means to be the guerilla/insurrection/partisan/terrorist type of warfare.

In this regard, the concepts of Trinquier were light years ahead of Martin van Creveld, the Israeli military historian and theorist, who has also popularized ideas similar to what Trinquier did much earlier!

[I can also suggest that ELITES the world-over saw and realized that WORLD WARS were too destructive of the established order. WW1 and WW2 ended with EMPIRES BEING OBLITERATED. Nature abhors a vacuum. SOMETHING FILLED THE VACUUM THAT WAS NOT EASILY CONTROLLED BY THE ELITES!! Better to wage war at a much less intense level, but at a controllable level, FOR COMMUNIST AND NON-COMMUNIST ELITES BOTH!!!]

A form of warfare [MODERN] recognized by Trinquier as NOT being easily combated by the conventional military forces of the major world powers, France, U.S., England. Conventional [traditional] military force was NOT up to the task of combating MODERN warfare.

Trinquier also saw MODERN warfare as being the ideal vehicle for waging war by the various communist and nationalistic insurrectionist movements around the world in the aftermath of WW2. The “war of the flea”. Think here of the Philippines [Huks], Vietnam [Viet Minh and later Viet Cong], Malaya [CT’s], Kenya [Mau-Mau], Cyprus [EOKA], etc. Insurrectionists that lacked the panoply of military might of a conventional military power could successfully fight wars. LACKING SUCH MILITARY POWER VIS-À-VIS THE ADVERSARY WAS AN ASSET THAT COULD BE EXPLOITED.!

Please do not think that Roger Trinquier was a mere “theorist”. Commanded “troops” during the First Indo-China War in a manner that is hard to conceive. AS A MAJOR, WAS IN CHARGE OF ORGANIZING AND HAD UNDER HIS CONTROL TWENTY THOUSAND [20,000] TROOPS. This was the GCMA. French “special forces”. Frenchmen who parachuted into the most remote areas of Indo-China. To organize, train and lead into combat mountain-dwellers [montagnards in French] opposed to the Viet Minh. Guerillas conducting guerilla warfare against the guerillas [Viet Minh]. GCMA units did wage combat successfully against the Viet Minh, but at wars end were abandoned to a cruel and terrible fate. See this blog entry regarding same.

Trinquier not ONLY theorized the “wave” of MODERN warfare, but also proposed an antidote. An antidote that was multi-faceted and WAS used by the French in both Indo-China, Algeria, and by the American forces in the Second Indo-China War. Methods that were successful to a degree, but did not prove to be decisive in the long run. These antidotes included:

* Use of small and mobile commando teams. [one thinks here of the German SS French Foreign Legion battalion.]

* Torture.

* Setting-up of self-defense forces [U.S. called this CIDG] recruited in the local population.

* Their [local] populations forced relocation in camps. [euphemistically called "resettlement"]

* Psychological and educational operations.

See "MODERN WARFARE - - A French View of Counterinsurgency" as authored by Trinquier here for the entire document.

Most controversial of the methods espoused by Trinquier was the approved of and institutionalized use of TORTURE as a legitimate means in interrogations of captured TERRORISTS!

[when Trinquier speaks of “terrorists”, I am not exactly sure of what he is speaking about. If he is speaking of those persons that wantonly and with cold-blooded pre-meditation target and kill and do so with pleasure strictly civilians, the perpetrator disguising himself in the process, that is a terrorist. NOT subject to the normal protections a soldier is guaranteed under the conventional laws of land warfare. I think that when Triquier speaks of “terrorists”, he is thinking in more generic terms. Persons ordinarily categorized as GUERILLAS would be considered a “terrorist” according to the definition of Trinquier?]

[it should also be obvious that during the initial stages of American involvement in the Vietnam conflict, the “antidotes” of Trinquier was widely adopted. I had often wondered to what extent the American military in Vietnam did consult with the French regarding strategy, operations, tactics, etc. What worked, what did not work, what about this, what about that, etc. Like getting a second opinion from a doctor regarding treatment for an illness, etc. This sort of thing MUST have gone on, at least, again, during the initial stages of American involvement [up until 1965 or so!!]].

In the aftermath of 9/11, and the continuing anti-jihadi war, wherever fought, the ideas of Trinquier become even more relevant. The jihadi has adopted MODERN warfare as THE WAY TO GO in combating the “west”, especially the United States. We can see that TERRORISM, in all it’s manifestations, is seen by the jihadi as the MEANS to defeat the “western” powers, culture, and the pervasive “western” way-of-life that has dominated the planet for the last five hundred years or so!!

The anti-jihadi war cannot be won alone with sheer military force. As Trinquier would have advocated, a multi-faceted approach is needed for the LONG-HAUL. As much a non-military solution as a military solution!

It should also be noted that the jihadi is NOT confined, as was the Vietnamese, the Cypriot, and the Filipino, to waging MODERN warfare within a certain geographical entity. The Viet Minh, EOKA, or the Huk would have never even contemplated a worldwide campaign as does the modern jihadi. The jihadi also aspires to using WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION [WMD]. They [the jihadi] are nihilist in a way the otherguerillas/insurgents/partisans/terrorists were not. Also, that the jihadi seeks and desperately WANTS WMD would probably not be something that would have occurred to Trinquier.

Now, one might very well ask the question, “what about the various conventional wars between the Arabs and the Israelis, or Gulf War One and Gulf War Two? Are these not MODERN wars that are being fought in the ‘traditional’ sense?” “Might we also see a ‘traditional’war fought at some time in the future on the Korean peninsula?” How would these wars fit into the theories as espoused by Trinquier? I guess the answer would be that these are the rare exceptions to the rule, AND ARE LOCALIZED, NOT GLOBAL IN NATURE AS WAS WW1 AND WW2! THE TREND GLOBALLY IS AWAY FROM SUCH WARS, NOW AND INTO THE FUTURE!

See this interesting foreword to the “French View of Counterinsurgency” written by Bernard Fall in 1963! Quite prescient! The writings of Fall were more or less obligatory for deploying American officers during the Second Indo-China War.

Trinquier now, and for some time into the future?!

It would seem so!

coolbert.