Casualties!
This is coolbert:
From the time of the American Civil War [1860's] onward, there has been an exponential increase in the lethality present on the battlefield.
This exponential increase began with the widespread use of the muzzle-loading, rifled musket firing a conoidal bullet. The infantryman of the time was now able to fire faster, at longer ranges, and with greater accuracy than say the infantryman of the Napoleonic era.
Tactics however, as employed by the attacker on the battlefield, did not change, even as battlefield lethality increased exponentially.
Troops and commanders of the era were taught, and continued to cling to, tactics of the Napoleonic era. Advance over open ground in closed, bunched formations.
Such tactics, closed bunched formations of advancing troops, DID make tempting targets for defenders.
Defenders WERE ABLE to inflict catastrophic casualties on attackers employing Napoleonic era tactics.
[this quite often involved troops occupying and defending from breastworks. Entrenched.]
This became quite evident first during the American Civil War. We find the mismatch of tactics and weaponry occurring during the battles of:
* Gettysburg - - Lee attacking, 5,000 Confederate casualties in thirty minutes!!
* Franklin - - Hood attacking, 7,000 Confederate casualties in one day!!
* Cold Harbor - - Grant attacking, 10,000 Union casualties in ten minutes!!
[it was joke among Union troops of the time to yell at General Grant, "Yoo-hoo, General Grant, remember me?? I was wounded at Cold Harbor!!]
Of course, such catastrophic casualties were NOT limited to the American Civil War. The Franco-Prussian War of 1870 witnessed such similar catastrophes. It seems the commanders of this era just did not learn fast enough from the experiences of other armies.
Both the French and Prussian armies of 1870 were equipped with needle-guns. Single shot, breech loaded, black powder weapons, resembling a bolt action rifle that gave the infantryman of both armies a firepower that exceeded that found on the battlefields of the American Civil War.
[French and German each had their own versions of the needle gun. The French chassepot being effective out to ranges of 1500 yards, the German Dryse effective out to 600 yards. In the hands of trained rifle men, these were effective weapons.]
The French chassepot.
The Prussian Dryse.
Prussian infantrymen, attacking in a very foolhardy fashion, over open ground in bunched, confined formations, twice were annihilated in enormous numbers by French defenders. This occurred at:
* Mars-la-Tour - - 5,000 Prussian dead in fifteen minutes!!!
* St. Privat - - 8,000 Prussian casualties in one day!!
[When contemplating the casualty figures of the American Civil War and the Franco-Prussian War, the casualties incurred by U.S. forces during the Global War on Terror [GWOT] are trifling in comparison, are they not??!!]
From the book, "The Face of Battle", by John Keegan, we find this interesting description of the engagement between the Prussian attacker and the entrenched French defender at St. Privat:
"So the skirmishing lines of the Guard [the Prussian Guard, the officers of noble rank and military tradition], with thick columns behind them, extended themselves over the bare fields below St. Privat and began to make their way up the slopes in the face of the French fire . . . The result was a massacre. The field officers on their horses were the first casualties. The men on foot struggled forward against the chassepot fire, as if into a hailstorm, shoulders hunched, heads bowed, directed only by the shouts of their leaders and the discordant noise of their regimental bugles and drums. All formations disintegrated; the men broke up their columns into a single thick and ragged skirmishing line and inched their way forward up the bare glacis of the fields until they were within some six hundred yards of St. Privat. There they stopped. NO more urging could get the survivors forward. They could only crouch in firing positions and wait for the attack of the Saxons, which they had so disastrously anticipated to develop on their left flank. The casualty returns were to reveal over 8,000 officers and men killed and wounded, mostly in twenty minutes, more than a quarter of the Corps strength. If anything was needed to vindicate the French faith in the chassepot, it was the aristocratic corpses which so thickly strewed the fields between St. Privat and St.-Marie-les-Chenes."
[note: The Prussian attack at St. Privat stalled at a range of 600 yards from the French entrenchments. This is only where the Prussian needle guns became effective. The French chassepot rifles were effective out to much greater range [1500 yards]. This was a great advantage for the French, who probably employed "plunging" rifle fire to stop the Prussian attack. Only at 600 yards could the Prussian infantry BEGIN to fire back at their tormentors with effective rifle fire of their own. And probably NOT that effective, the French being entrenched, the Prussians NOT!!]
A son [wounded at the battle] of Bismarck was present at St. Privat. The famous quotation of Bismarck regarding war can perhaps be attributed to the experiences of this son [Herbert] relating his experiences to his father!!??
"Anyone who has ever looked into the glazed eyes of a soldier dying on the
battlefield will think hard before starting a war." - - Otto von Bismarck.
As late as 1876, the Russians at Plevna continued to use the Napoleonic closely bunched, confined formations of troops advancing over open ground in the attack. AND DOING SO REPEATEDLY!! With of course very disastrous consequences. I have blogged on Plevna recently. Commanders of the time DID NOT seem to learn and continued to use antiquated offensive tactics even in the face of overwhelming defensive firepower.
According to De Puy obstinacy on the part of commanders on the battlefield is NOT confined to any one nation or army:
"it should be noted that after the introduction of a new weapon prototype, and the subsequent adoption of the weapon into the armaments inventory, there has always been a substantial period before the weapon has been assimilated fully into the tactics and doctrine of the forces employing that weapon . . . this period of assimilation has been approximately twenty to twenty-five years, or about one generation."
The needle guns had created a situation where the Napoleonic era tactics no longer sufficed and were downright dangerous [murderous??] to the advancing infantryman. The Prussians, and probably the French too, had not developed tactics to deal with the increased lethality posed on the battle by the chassepot and it's Prussian counter-part!!
[in that book of Keegan's, "The Face of Battle", is a picture of Russian infantry advancing on the battlefield in the early days of World War One [WW1]. What do you see?? A closely bunched, tight, confined formation of troops, making an ideal target for machine gunners of the day. Even DECADES after Plevna, it seems the lesson of defensive firepower overwhelming the offensive tactics of the day had YET NOT sunk in the heads of commanders and General Staffs of the time?!]
coolbert.
This exponential increase began with the widespread use of the muzzle-loading, rifled musket firing a conoidal bullet. The infantryman of the time was now able to fire faster, at longer ranges, and with greater accuracy than say the infantryman of the Napoleonic era.
Tactics however, as employed by the attacker on the battlefield, did not change, even as battlefield lethality increased exponentially.
Troops and commanders of the era were taught, and continued to cling to, tactics of the Napoleonic era. Advance over open ground in closed, bunched formations.
Such tactics, closed bunched formations of advancing troops, DID make tempting targets for defenders.
Defenders WERE ABLE to inflict catastrophic casualties on attackers employing Napoleonic era tactics.
[this quite often involved troops occupying and defending from breastworks. Entrenched.]
This became quite evident first during the American Civil War. We find the mismatch of tactics and weaponry occurring during the battles of:
* Gettysburg - - Lee attacking, 5,000 Confederate casualties in thirty minutes!!
* Franklin - - Hood attacking, 7,000 Confederate casualties in one day!!
* Cold Harbor - - Grant attacking, 10,000 Union casualties in ten minutes!!
[it was joke among Union troops of the time to yell at General Grant, "Yoo-hoo, General Grant, remember me?? I was wounded at Cold Harbor!!]
Of course, such catastrophic casualties were NOT limited to the American Civil War. The Franco-Prussian War of 1870 witnessed such similar catastrophes. It seems the commanders of this era just did not learn fast enough from the experiences of other armies.
Both the French and Prussian armies of 1870 were equipped with needle-guns. Single shot, breech loaded, black powder weapons, resembling a bolt action rifle that gave the infantryman of both armies a firepower that exceeded that found on the battlefields of the American Civil War.
[French and German each had their own versions of the needle gun. The French chassepot being effective out to ranges of 1500 yards, the German Dryse effective out to 600 yards. In the hands of trained rifle men, these were effective weapons.]
The French chassepot.
The Prussian Dryse.
Prussian infantrymen, attacking in a very foolhardy fashion, over open ground in bunched, confined formations, twice were annihilated in enormous numbers by French defenders. This occurred at:
* Mars-la-Tour - - 5,000 Prussian dead in fifteen minutes!!!
* St. Privat - - 8,000 Prussian casualties in one day!!
[When contemplating the casualty figures of the American Civil War and the Franco-Prussian War, the casualties incurred by U.S. forces during the Global War on Terror [GWOT] are trifling in comparison, are they not??!!]
From the book, "The Face of Battle", by John Keegan, we find this interesting description of the engagement between the Prussian attacker and the entrenched French defender at St. Privat:
"So the skirmishing lines of the Guard [the Prussian Guard, the officers of noble rank and military tradition], with thick columns behind them, extended themselves over the bare fields below St. Privat and began to make their way up the slopes in the face of the French fire . . . The result was a massacre. The field officers on their horses were the first casualties. The men on foot struggled forward against the chassepot fire, as if into a hailstorm, shoulders hunched, heads bowed, directed only by the shouts of their leaders and the discordant noise of their regimental bugles and drums. All formations disintegrated; the men broke up their columns into a single thick and ragged skirmishing line and inched their way forward up the bare glacis of the fields until they were within some six hundred yards of St. Privat. There they stopped. NO more urging could get the survivors forward. They could only crouch in firing positions and wait for the attack of the Saxons, which they had so disastrously anticipated to develop on their left flank. The casualty returns were to reveal over 8,000 officers and men killed and wounded, mostly in twenty minutes, more than a quarter of the Corps strength. If anything was needed to vindicate the French faith in the chassepot, it was the aristocratic corpses which so thickly strewed the fields between St. Privat and St.-Marie-les-Chenes."
[note: The Prussian attack at St. Privat stalled at a range of 600 yards from the French entrenchments. This is only where the Prussian needle guns became effective. The French chassepot rifles were effective out to much greater range [1500 yards]. This was a great advantage for the French, who probably employed "plunging" rifle fire to stop the Prussian attack. Only at 600 yards could the Prussian infantry BEGIN to fire back at their tormentors with effective rifle fire of their own. And probably NOT that effective, the French being entrenched, the Prussians NOT!!]
A son [wounded at the battle] of Bismarck was present at St. Privat. The famous quotation of Bismarck regarding war can perhaps be attributed to the experiences of this son [Herbert] relating his experiences to his father!!??
"Anyone who has ever looked into the glazed eyes of a soldier dying on the
battlefield will think hard before starting a war." - - Otto von Bismarck.
As late as 1876, the Russians at Plevna continued to use the Napoleonic closely bunched, confined formations of troops advancing over open ground in the attack. AND DOING SO REPEATEDLY!! With of course very disastrous consequences. I have blogged on Plevna recently. Commanders of the time DID NOT seem to learn and continued to use antiquated offensive tactics even in the face of overwhelming defensive firepower.
According to De Puy obstinacy on the part of commanders on the battlefield is NOT confined to any one nation or army:
"it should be noted that after the introduction of a new weapon prototype, and the subsequent adoption of the weapon into the armaments inventory, there has always been a substantial period before the weapon has been assimilated fully into the tactics and doctrine of the forces employing that weapon . . . this period of assimilation has been approximately twenty to twenty-five years, or about one generation."
The needle guns had created a situation where the Napoleonic era tactics no longer sufficed and were downright dangerous [murderous??] to the advancing infantryman. The Prussians, and probably the French too, had not developed tactics to deal with the increased lethality posed on the battle by the chassepot and it's Prussian counter-part!!
[in that book of Keegan's, "The Face of Battle", is a picture of Russian infantry advancing on the battlefield in the early days of World War One [WW1]. What do you see?? A closely bunched, tight, confined formation of troops, making an ideal target for machine gunners of the day. Even DECADES after Plevna, it seems the lesson of defensive firepower overwhelming the offensive tactics of the day had YET NOT sunk in the heads of commanders and General Staffs of the time?!]
coolbert.
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