Reds.

This is coolbert:

During the Cold War between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, a war that lasted from 1945-1990, there was the real constant fear of a the "cold war" becoming a "hot war". And U.S. military planners did see and were dismayed by the Soviet "threat". On paper, the Soviets DID possess more submarines, more tanks, more ICBM's [intercontinental ballistic missiles] with more and more potent nuclear warheads than did the U.S. military forces. The Soviet military WAS a huge and potentially very grave threat to U.S. military forces all over the world.

Of most primary significance to the "western democracies", NATO in particular [led by U.S. commanders and significantly manned by U.S. troops] was the threat of a massive Soviet attack on western Europe [Big Red moves west!!].

All sorts of scenarios were conjured by NATO planners that saw the Soviets launching a conventional attack on western Europe that would have been unstoppable. The preponderance of the Soviet military consisted of ground forces, the Soviet Army. Once again, on paper, the Soviets DID possess a significant and very threatening quantitative edge on the potential battlefield. More tanks, more artillery, more rocket launchers, just more of everything that counted in modern warfare. Some experts commented that all this ground force equipment was to a degree inferior to U.S. equipment. However, in the eyes of most observers, NOT that much inferior to make a marked difference in actual combat.

This threat of a massive Soviet ground attack on western Europe was further exacerbated by some observations made by U.S. planners in the 1970's. Soviet units that would have spearheaded any attack upon NATO were moved into permanent forward bases close to the border between West and East Germany. These units, furthermore, were then equipped with a full thirty day supply of fuel and ammunition at all times. There would not have been any need to prepare these units for combat. The order could have been given to go and these spearhead units would have been able to move and conduct a thirty day campaign without any resupply. This was all very alarming and significant to NATO commanders and planners.

As part of this assessment of the Soviet "threat", manpower considerations were also taken into account. And the Soviet military was seen as being manned by competent, and in some cases very able troops.

Was this true??

From a variety of defectors prior to 1990, and from post-Soviet-era research of independent observers, it can be see that some questions surely should have been raised as to the competency and ability of the Soviet troops of the ground forces. [I am not talking about the troops of the other military branches here. I am talking here strictly about ground force troops. As this was by far the bulk of the Soviet military, this would obviously been of paramount concern to NATO planners].

Accounts of the various defectors seem to suggest that the troops of the Soviet military from top to bottom could be categorized into three groupings.

At the top was a very small, very elite, very powerful number of the top Marshals [commanders of armies, called a front in Soviet parlance] and Soviet Generals. These men indulged themselves in what only be called a sybaritic [pleasure and luxury] lifestyle. A lifestyle that almost no one else in the old Soviet Union could ever hope to achieve. Numbers of private villas [called dachas], private hunting preserves of immense size, accompanied by an entourage of fawning "yes" men [lickspittles], cooks, gardeners, valets, chauffeurs, guards, and young female "entertainers". It was if the nobility of Tsarist Russian was replaced by the most senior officers of the "army of the people". The princes and Grand Dukes of the Tsarist era were now called Marshals and Generals. And this from an army that professed itself to be the savior of "oppressed" people all over the world!

At the bottom would be found the draftees of the Soviet Army.

As one might expect, the conditions endured by the Soviet ground force draftee was in extreme marked contrast to the lifestyle of the Marshals and Generals. The life of a Soviet Army draftee, serving a two year term of enlistment, can best be equated to that of a stockyard animal. Kept in cramped quarters, with little chance to wash and clean oneself, fed a coarse, bland, diet that was barely minimum to ensure sound health, these troops led a life of spartan austere privation.

And the quality of the Soviet Army draftee led much to be desired also, according to the various defectors. We are speaking here about men that had in many cases only a very rudimentary knowledge of the Russian language [Russian was the lingua fraca of the Soviet Army]. In some cases troops could not speak any Russian at all! [Soviet troops needed to know and were taught ten basic commands in Russian.] Educationally the bulk of the troops in the ground forces left much to be desired also. Illiteracy and semi-illiteracy was abundant, instruction in soldiering tasks being carried out at a very basic and low level.

Ethnic tension and hatred did exist among the low ranking draftees. This hatred and tension did from time to time boil over into real pitched battles between ethnic groups [quite often between "Christians" and "Muslims". I am speaking ethnically here]. These battles would often involve thousands of troops on each side, using bare hands, clubs, knives, hatchets, shovels, etc.

These draftees were in most cases ill-disciplined, order having to be maintained by a system of military law that was very harsh, cruel, even sadistic in nature.

Also, among the draftees there existed within the barracks an informal but potent system of what was called "grandfather rule". Troops that had completed their first year of draftee service had instituted an informal system by which they dominated and abused those draftees that were just beginning their two term of service. The American General Odom, a fluent Russian speaker, and former head of the National Security Agency [NSA], describes "grandfather" rule as being akin to fraternity house initiations. I would disagree with this whole heartedly. Descriptions from defectors seem to suggest that it is way too mild to compare the rule of the more senior soldiers over the raw recruits as "frat house hijinks". Again, this "grandfather rule" was very harsh, cruel, even sadistic in nature.

Sandwiched in between these two polar opposite groups were the junior officers of the Soviet Army. Those lieutenants, captains, majors, and colonels who would have led the combat troops into battle. The men that would led the spearhead units to what the Soviets would have expected to be "the victory for world proletariat". These junior officers are said to have been competent, able, dedicated and for the most part professional. Soldiers that knew their tasks. Soldiers also abused by a system that was venal at the top and of low quality at the bottom. Soldiers that after years of experience developed an attitude that can be best described as "jaded".

So, how would the Soviet Army have performed against NATO forces if "Big Red" had moved west?? Surprisingly, those junior officers previously mentioned did feel the Soviet Army would have given a good account of itself. Even with all the personnel drawbacks inherent in the Soviet system, the Soviet Army, due to sheer mass primarily, would have posed a serious problem for NATO to contain.

[One has to wonder about this self-appraisal of the Soviet Army. The Soviet performance in Afghanistan left MUCH to be desired. Especially among the draftee ground force units. Soviet units such as airborne units, air assault, and special purpose [Spetsnaz], did acquit themselves well. Run-of-the-mill ground force units, however, not so well. One thing the Afghan guerilla fighters came to notice was that when ambushing Soviet units, the officers of the ambushed unit tended to bunch together in one group, the draftee private soldiers in another group. This demonstrates a serious lack of confidence on the part of both officers and enlisted and a total absence of unit cohesion. When Custer and his men were annihilated at the Little Bighorn, the officers were found laying in one group, the remaining enlisted troops in another group, demonstrating that in that instance too, unit cohesion had broken down under severe stress].

[The performance of the Russian Army in both Chechen Wars also leaves much to be desired. Frustration with an inability to bring to grips the Chechen fighters has been a source of great embarrassment to the Russians. Many atrocities are purported to have been committed by undisciplined troops, officers and enlisted both].

coolbert.