Fallujah!
This is coolbert:
It seems the U.S. military has done a very good job fighting in the streets of Fallujah.
City fighting has always been difficult for any military. Defenders can take advantage of aspects of city fighting to negate firepower advantages that a more robust attacker may have.
These aspects would include narrow streets, subterranean systems [sewers, tunnels, basements], and a three dimensional battlefield [street-level, multistory buildings and rooftops], and the previously mentioned subterranean environment.
This sort of environment creates a situation that precludes maneuver that attackers can use in combination with superior firepower to readily defeat the defender. In the case of urban combat, neither maneuver or firepower is always feasible. You must often go directly at the defender, a defender who is fighting on his turf, turf that quite often has been improved to facilitate defense.
The classic urban warfare scenario of the past has been Stalingrad. The German Sixth Army, the army whose commander [von Paulus] was told by Hitler himself, "with your army you can do anything!", found itself trapped in a never ending nightmare of urban combat against a stubborn and relentless defender [Soviet troops]. This urban combat eventually wore down the Sixth Army and led to it's eventual defeat and capitulation.
The U.S. military was very much aware in advance of the difficulties of urban combat and studied the subject judiciously and did arrive at definitive conclusions and solutions to the problem of urban combat. Solutions that have been obviously been implemented.
[an impetus to studying the problems of urban combat was a realization that any war in western Europe in defense against a Soviet invasion would involve a lot of urban combat, western Europe being perhaps the most urbanized area on the planet.]
The U.S. military term for urban combat is Military Operations Urban Terrain [MOUT]. And a LOT of thought was given to the correct tactics to be employed in urban combat. Tactics that would be both successful and also minimize casualties. Among these tactics [among others] are the correct methods for:
* Clearing a building [work from the top downward within a building to the greatest extent possible].
* Movement within a building [don't move within hallways and don't enter rooms by doorways to the greatest extent possible. Use mouseholes [holes cut in walls] when moving from room to room].
* Clearing a room [toss in a hand grenade low and hard, allow it to detonate, and then rush into the room firing three round bursts low at different directions within the room. This done by a two man buddy team].
* Have proper equipment on hand. Urban warfare will require equipment that is not normally carried by the infantry soldier. To include pick axes, sledge hammers, rope ladders and knotted ropes [for scaling], demolition explosives, and lots of hand grenades.
As has been mentioned before, it seems the U.S. has learned and put into practice "lessons learned" from historical urban combats. And did very well, if the statistics of this Fallujah incursion are to be believed. And the insurgents did put up a fight, and did have months to prepare. This was not a cakewalk.
Of great value seemed to be the Bradley vehicle.
City fighting has always been difficult for any military. Defenders can take advantage of aspects of city fighting to negate firepower advantages that a more robust attacker may have.
These aspects would include narrow streets, subterranean systems [sewers, tunnels, basements], and a three dimensional battlefield [street-level, multistory buildings and rooftops], and the previously mentioned subterranean environment.
This sort of environment creates a situation that precludes maneuver that attackers can use in combination with superior firepower to readily defeat the defender. In the case of urban combat, neither maneuver or firepower is always feasible. You must often go directly at the defender, a defender who is fighting on his turf, turf that quite often has been improved to facilitate defense.
The classic urban warfare scenario of the past has been Stalingrad. The German Sixth Army, the army whose commander [von Paulus] was told by Hitler himself, "with your army you can do anything!", found itself trapped in a never ending nightmare of urban combat against a stubborn and relentless defender [Soviet troops]. This urban combat eventually wore down the Sixth Army and led to it's eventual defeat and capitulation.
The U.S. military was very much aware in advance of the difficulties of urban combat and studied the subject judiciously and did arrive at definitive conclusions and solutions to the problem of urban combat. Solutions that have been obviously been implemented.
[an impetus to studying the problems of urban combat was a realization that any war in western Europe in defense against a Soviet invasion would involve a lot of urban combat, western Europe being perhaps the most urbanized area on the planet.]
The U.S. military term for urban combat is Military Operations Urban Terrain [MOUT]. And a LOT of thought was given to the correct tactics to be employed in urban combat. Tactics that would be both successful and also minimize casualties. Among these tactics [among others] are the correct methods for:
* Clearing a building [work from the top downward within a building to the greatest extent possible].
* Movement within a building [don't move within hallways and don't enter rooms by doorways to the greatest extent possible. Use mouseholes [holes cut in walls] when moving from room to room].
* Clearing a room [toss in a hand grenade low and hard, allow it to detonate, and then rush into the room firing three round bursts low at different directions within the room. This done by a two man buddy team].
* Have proper equipment on hand. Urban warfare will require equipment that is not normally carried by the infantry soldier. To include pick axes, sledge hammers, rope ladders and knotted ropes [for scaling], demolition explosives, and lots of hand grenades.
As has been mentioned before, it seems the U.S. has learned and put into practice "lessons learned" from historical urban combats. And did very well, if the statistics of this Fallujah incursion are to be believed. And the insurgents did put up a fight, and did have months to prepare. This was not a cakewalk.
Of great value seemed to be the Bradley vehicle.
The 25 mm cannon on the Bradley was evidently put to great use in the Fallujah fighting.
The Bradley seems to be the ideal vehicle for MOUT.
Can move through narrow streets where a conventional tank cannot.
Provides protection for the crew with it's armor, has a five man team of infantry carried within that can provide further protection when dismounting, and that 25 mm cannon fires a armor piercing high explosive [APHE] round that penetrates through the walls of a building and then explodes, sending killing shrapnel through the building.
The U.S. military is to be given accolades for a job very well done. This sort of success is not often obtained without a lot of trial and error that often results in casualties that are regrettable. This was not the case here!!
coolbert.
The U.S. military is to be given accolades for a job very well done. This sort of success is not often obtained without a lot of trial and error that often results in casualties that are regrettable. This was not the case here!!
coolbert.
Labels: Iraq
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