Elusive?

This is coolbert:

In his book, "Elusive Victory", a book about the various Arab-Israeli war, Trevor Dupuy makes a most startling assertion. Based upon his interviews of Egyptians that were supposedly well informed, the 1967 war [The Six Day War] between the Arabs and the Israelis was not supposed to occur.

The contention of the Egyptian sources is that the 1967 war was all a mistake. Nasser, at the time President of Egypt, did not seek a war with Israel, but only a "provocation". A provocation that was for domestic Egyptian consumption, and also for external Arab consumption also. Provoking the Israelis but not carrying the situation to actual war is supposedly what Nasser sought. To show his own public and the Arab public at large that he [Nasser] was not weak, but could confront the "Zionist entity".

However, war between the Arab forces and the Israeli did occur, with disastrous consequences for the Arabs. Consequences that have lasted to this day and continue to fester.

If this is true, that the Egyptians did not seek war, they certainly go about things in a strange manner. First, the Egyptians moved their main striking force, a 100,000 man mechanized army, right to the border of Israel. Second, Nasser ordered the U.N. Peacekeeping force to leave the Sinai at once, with haste. Third, Nasser announced a blockade of the Straits of Tiran. This strait, if blocked would stop Israeli shipping from exiting the Gulf of Aqaba into the Red Sea and transitting into the Indian Ocean. This blockade itself constituted an act of war! Fourthly, the Arab world wide media, on cue, began very inflammatory broadcasts that described the forthcoming confrontation with Israel. A confrontation that would lead to annihilation of the "Zionist entity". It did appear that war was at hand!

The Egyptians interviewed by De Puy maintain that while all the above was true, all-out war was not the goal. Confrontation and demonstration is what Nasser sought, but not an all out war. So say the informants of De Puy. And these informants would in probability be persons at the upper echelons of Egyptian society and confidants of Nasser. If anyone would know, these persons would supposedly know what was what!

All these moves of the Egyptian, occurring in such short order, and all at once, did cause grave concern among the Israeli political and military leadership. It did seem to the Israeli that an outbreak of total war with the Arab was imminent. And that an Israeli response would be required, and in short order too. And Israeli strategy and doctrine called for not a war of attrition with the Arab forces, but what would better termed as "active defense" From the onset of war, the Israeli intended to obtain and maintain the initiative, meet the enemy at the borders of Israel, and carry the war to the enemy, pursuing them to the greatest extent possible after inflicting decisive defeat. Once Nasser had made the decision to confront and provoke Israel, he should have realized that Israeli response would not be timid. Rather the opposite. [Nasser was a military man and should have realized this].

One particular aspect of this military-march-to-war greatly alarmed the Israeli. This was the build up on their border of the 100,000 man Egyptian mechanized strike force. This type of build up had been seen once before by the Israeli, occurring in 1962. At that time, the Egyptian, and as was seen again in 1967, moved the main strength of their army to the border with Israeli, as an exercise, and just sat it there. And this build up in 1962 was not discovered by the Israeli until after the Egyptians had sat this force on their border for two weeks! [the only way the Israeli discovered the Egyptian force in 1962 was when an Israeli analyst had been watching an Egyptian TV broadcast where an interview with an Egyptian soldier stationed on the border with Israel was aired. It was only after seeing this broadcast and sending up reconnaissance aircraft to confirm the existence of this large Egyptian mechanized force that the Israeli realized the danger that they were in]. The Israeli even had a name for this build up of the Egyptian mechanized force, calling it "rotem" [meaning unclear, may mean 'a tree growing in the wilderness']. This almost identical repetition of "rotem" in 1967 was surely a sign to the Israeli that the Egyptian meant to attack them.

Dupuy mentions a minor episode that to me carries great weight, when taken in the context of this major military build up by the Egyptian, coupled with the expulsion of the U.N. Peacekeepers, the announcement of the blockade of Israeli shipping, and the inflammatory broadcasts of Arab radio. In the latter days of May, just prior to the outbreak of the Six Day War, the Nasser Higher Military Academy [probably equivalent to West Point], graduated about seven hundred cadets, commissioning them as new lieutenants in the Egyptian Army. These new officers were given two days leave and told to report to their units in the Sinai. The normal procedure for graduates prior to this time was for grads to be given thirty days leave prior to their units. To me, if I was an intelligence analyst, and had been given this bit of data presented in the context of the Egyptian build up and threats, would have been a clear signal that the Egyptian was preparing for war, and not just making threats or confronting!

The result of all this is well known! The Six Day War did occur, Israel striking pre-emptively, with the Arab forces suffering catastrophic and humiliating defeat. And the Israeli occupation of lands long held to be "Arab" continues to this day, to the detriment of all parties involved.

coolbert.