This is coolbert: An analysis of the effect of friendly firepower was done after the Battle of Khe Sanh in an attempt to determine how effective the Arc Light [B-52 bombers] bombing campaign [Operation Niagara] at Khe Sanh was, and what sort of casualties it caused the North Vietnamese.

Now, it is very useful in any endeavor to obtain feedback. Feedback that allow you to determine if you are on the right course or not. In manufacturing, you use periodic or regular quality control [QC] checks to see if parts are being made according to specifications. And you may do surveys to see if the customers are happy or not with your service. Students are given tests by the teacher to see if the students are absorbing and learning the material and have mastered it or not. And if they not, where are they lacking so that you can appropriately tailor the instruction to make up for what is lacking. If you shooting at paper targets that are located a long distance off, you use a spotting scope to see if you are on target or not. This is all rather obvious.

And it is the same for the military. The military uses similar managerial techniques to see if what they are doing is working or not. If it is working, continue or accelerate the process. If not working, figure out why, and make adjustments.

At Khe Sanh, three types of assessments were used to determine how effective the aerial campaign of the B-52 bombers were. One method was "cause and effect". A second method was "killed by air". A third method was "bomb damage assessment". Click here to see a web site of the analysis and how the calculations were made. Particular attention should be paid to page ten.

Some assumptions were made for these calculations to be valid:

[Please note that all these calculations assume that for each killed in action [KIA], 3.44 wounded will have to be evacuated. This number is based upon American experiences during the war].

[Also 2000 enemy troops were counted as dead on assaults on Marine positions at Khe Sanh. This figure is taken into account in all calculations.]

[Enemy troop strength for these calculations is shown to be an average of 15,000 for the campaign. This would probably be infantry troops and not count support, although I am not sure about this].

The "cause and effect" analysis says that if you have this many friendlies in this size area, and they suffer this many casualties from this weight of enemy bombardment, you can create an equation that will allow you determine indirectly what the enemies approximate casualties from your own bombardment will be, all things being equal. See page ten of the above web site to see how this equation was created and how the calculations were done. This is of course, again, an indirect method of determining enemy casualties.

"Killed by Air" [KBA] analysis looks at the actual number of enemy KIA observed by aerial observers during air attacks on enemy positions and troop dispositions. In this case, 1288 were seen killed from the air.

The third method of analysis, "bomb damage assessment" [BDA], combines the direct observed enemy KIA as observed from aerial observers [KBA], plus combines the inferred losses from different types of damage. For instance, for each truck destroyed, one enemy soldier was said to be killed. For each bunker destroyed, two enemy soldiers were said to be killed. Etc. See page thirteen of the above web site for this analysis.

These equations and calculations show somewhat striking differences that shows the difficulty in determining with accuracy how effective the bombing campaign at Khe Sanh was. KBA shows the least casualties [14,600], BDA shows the most [28,900], and cause and effect comes up with a result somewhere in between the two former calculations [24,600].

This comment is made in the SECRET report to MACV [Military Assistance Command Vietnam] headquarters about Niagara:

"The magnitude of the enemy losses maybe appear to be unreasonable in light of the enemy's average strength of 15,000 troops."

What the reporter is saying is that the U.S. killed or wounded more enemy troops than were actually were deployed at Khe Sanh!? Well, the report then says that this takes into account that the North Vietnamese may have replaced losses, so these calculations are not to be considered invalid.


Are these methodologies invalid? Are the results they are producing way over optimistic? Show what the big shots want to see? I am not sure. In lieu of better methodologies, what is available to go with? And the use of three methodologies demonstrates that concern was there at the top to do things right and not to over inflate results. Maybe what they need to do is take all three results, average them, and use that figure as the best we can determine. A compromise.

Of course, there would be an even more valid method. Go to the North Vietnamese and as a historical exercise, ask them to glean their records to see what casualty figures they come up with. But, I am afraid, the North Vietnamese will always have a self-serving interest in this area, and you would not more expect to find the truth on casualties from them than you would find from the methodologies shown above.

coolbert.